Yossi Alpher:  The Roadmap: Flawed, But a Slim Hope for Peace

 

Hard Questions, Tough Answers

A weekly APN Q & A with Yossi Alpher

March 31, 2003

Yossi Alpher

 

Yossi Alpher is a former senior official with the Mossad and the former Director of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. He also served as a senior advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak during the Camp David summit. In collaboration with Ghassan Khatib, Minister of Labor in the Palestinian Authority, Yossi Alpher has created an Israeli-Palestinian internet dialogue called bitterlemons.org.

 

Q. There have been so many confusing new references to the Road Map. Where do we stand?

 

A. There has indeed been some evolution in the attitudes of the various sides to the Road Map, and these require clarification.

 

But to begin with, it is important to recognize what has not changed. First, the Road Map text being discussed is the same one that was presented unofficially, as a draft, to Israel and the Palestinians by the US in the name of the Quartet, on December 20 last year. Secondly, it has not yet been presented officially. And thirdly, in contrast with its Quartet partners, the administration's attitude toward the Road Map continues to appear to be largely instrumental, i.e., the Road Map is exploited by President Bush as a means of galvanizing his coalition for Iraq and softening opposition to the war, rather than to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace for its own sake and with the investment of considerable American diplomatic energies.

 

This brings us to the changes in approach. The primary catalyst behind Bush's intention -- declared on March 14 and repeated at a press conference -- to officially "present" the Road Map as soon as Palestinian Prime Minister-designate Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) takes office, rather than waiting until after the war in Iraq, is British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Under heavy attack politically at home for his government's advocacy of war in Iraq without UN approval, Blair and Foreign Minister Jack Straw have been campaigning to shore up parliamentary support from among Labor dissidents, and to soften Arab and European criticism, by focusing aggressively on the Israeli-Palestinian front.

 

The high point of this campaign thus far was Straw's public criticism of what he called the international community's "double standard" regarding compliance with UN resolutions by Iraq on the one hand and Israel on the other. Blair, for his part, has escalated the pressure on Bush to get involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict even as the war in Iraq proceeds.

 

The Sharon government, while coolly claiming that Bush's moves are fully coordinated with it, is not anxious, to say the least, to see the Road Map launched soon and in its present form. An Israeli "senior political source" last week termed Blair's performance "hysterical".

 

In general, Sharon's entourage has complied loyally with administration demands to maintain a low profile while the guns are booming in Iraq -- with regard to both Iraq itself and the conflict with the Palestinians. It has toned down its threat to demand "100 amendments" to the Road Map and has adjusted publicly to Bush's vague March 14 reference that he would entertain no more than additional "contributions" by the parties. But it continues to emphasize its lack of satisfaction with the latest version. Foreign Minister Sylvan Shalom's current trip to Washington -- to appear before AIPAC's annual meeting and meet the administration in his new post -- will be one vehicle of dialogue. But Sharon does not have sufficient confidence in or respect for Shalom to trust him with the real negotiating, which is being left to Director of the PM's Bureau Dov Weisglass.

 

The issue areas in the Road Map that Sharon still seeks to influence have reportedly been narrowed down to the following:

 

• ensuring that Abu Mazen indeed has genuine authority to negotiate;

 

• ensuring that the phase two "provisional" Palestinian state is the outcome of negotiations between the two sides;

 

• rejection of citation of the Saudi/Arab League initiative of March 2002, with its reference to withdrawal to the 1967 borders, as one of the Road Map's sources of authority;

 

• tougher Israeli security requirements as a precondition to political progress;

 

• clarification that a settlement freeze will only follow a prolonged period of improved security and that the phase two provisional Palestinian state will not require the removal of any settlements; and

 

• a demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a "Jewish state" to supplement the Road Map's call for an agreed and "realistic" solution to the refugee right of return issue in the final settlement.

 

Presumably some of these demands, such as ensuring that Abu Mazen has indeed wrested sufficient authority from Yasir Arafat, correspond with American concerns as well. But others, such as backtracking on settlements and rejecting references to the 1967 lines as a basis for final status negotiations, are liable to prove more problematic if and when the US agrees to implement the Road Map. After all, these reflect Sharon's fundamental drive to limit Palestinian "statehood" to the confines of phase two, i.e., a series of enclaves surrounded by settlements, more or less confined to the outlines of Oslo interim areas A and B, and constrained by so many additional Israeli demands and conditions that phase three -- a state more or less within the 1967 lines -- will never be reached.

 

Moreover, two of Sharon's new cabinet partners, the right wing NRP and National Union, are entitled under their coalition agreements to refuse to support Road Map provisions that they find problematic. This means that, even if the administration were to exercise pressure and Sharon were to prove forthcoming regarding the Road Map -- two big "ifs" -- Sharon's coalition might be jeopardized, thereby presenting the specter of a possible government shakeup and another attempt by Sharon to lure Labor into the coalition. This, in turn, would involve the administration, by means of the Road Map, in Israeli internal politics.

 

It would also place the spotlight on the Labor Party, which since losing the elections in late January has proven totally incapable of mounting a coherent parliamentary opposition. Amram Mitzna seems lost in the Knesset and unable to define himself as a party and opposition leader. He has not mounted a serious effort to evaluate the mistakes of the election campaign -- in particular his misplaced advocacy of resuming negotiations "where we left off at Taba". His predecessor, Binyamin Ben Eliezer, appears intent on wresting back the party leadership, even at the cost of further political damage.

 

The self-neutralization of Labor as an effective opposition has given Sharon a free hand to pursue his aggressive agenda vis-a-vis the Palestinians, for example in Gaza (until US requirements concerning the Iraq war required a lower Israeli profile). But it also calls into question the ability of Labor to address a new Sharon invitation to join the coalition, if it should come as a result of US pressures over the Road Map.

 

Turning to the Palestinian reaction to the notion of an "early" Road Map, it has, interestingly, been quite nuanced. First, because Abu Mazen has in any case not yet completed formation of his government: he is reportedly carefully weighing the need to appoint a minister of internal security who is both tough and non-controversial (thereby possibly ruling out former security chiefs Mohammed Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub), as well as the requirement for geographical balance in his cabinet (meaning more ministers from the Gaza Strip).

 

Secondly, for Abu Mazen, dealing seriously with the Road Map will mean having close contacts with the administration and probably holding a meeting with President Bush. The administration, and PM Blair, would undoubtedly find meetings with a bona fide Palestinian revolutionary like Abu Mazen to be attractive at a time when the Arab "street" is increasingly hostile to the war in Iraq. But precisely for this reason, Abu Mazen is reportedly hesitant. The last thing he needs right now is to be branded an American puppet. He has apparently let it be known that Washington will be the last stop on his list of prime ministerial visits. This in turn has nourished reports and rumors that Bush and Blair may still delay delivering the Road Map even after Abu Mazen has officially become prime minister.

 

Finally, with alerts regarding Palestinian terrorist attacks as high as ever -- 59 during the week of March 19 to 26, according to the Shabak (General Security Service) -- the danger of some sort of mega-suicide bombing against an Israeli target is as relevant as ever. It would almost certainly provoke a strong Israeli reaction. The result would be another setback for the peace process and possibly even for Abu Mazen's accession to power. Luckily, the suicide bombing in Netanya on March 30 did not cause any fatalities.

 

As for the administration's position with regard to the Road Map, it appears to be as ambiguous as ever. Bush remains indifferent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, with elections only 18 months away, is anxious not to alienate Israel and the American Jewish community over a peace process that in any case he never wished to get involved in. On the other hand, he is repeatedly called upon to make gestures regarding the conflict, both to keep his allies in Iraq on board and to accommodate Secretary of State Powell -- who spoke confidently to the Washington Post recently about the president's involvement and the anticipated pressures on both Palestinians and Israelis.

 

This brings us to the Road Map itself. It is, for many reasons, not a good plan (too many phases and international conferences, not enough strict American supervision), and it was cooked up by the Bush administration for all the wrong reasons. Nor is this the ideal time to broach ideas for Israeli-Palestinian peace, precisely because of the danger that players like Jack Straw will distort the rationale for peace. But it is the only game in town.

 

In the final analysis, supporters of a genuine Israeli-Palestinian peace process based on an end to Palestinian violence, an end to Israeli settlements and a two state solution within the 1967 boundaries, face a difficult challenge. On the one hand, they cannot and should not sanction the British rationale -- so popular in Europe and the Arab world -- about a double standard, as if it really were possible to compare Iraq's moral position and its legal status vis-a-vis the UN to those of Israel. On the other, they can and must speak out against Sharon's ongoing settlement expansion policy and his double-talk about a Palestinian state, together with the knee jerk support these positions seem to enjoy among some portions of the American Jewish community.

 

For two years now I have been writing that an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unlikely as long as none of the three key players -- Bush, Arafat and Sharon -- has a realistic strategy for peace. There is now a slim possibility that this equation will begin to change, with the emergence of Abu Mazen as Palestinian prime minister and the increasing pressures on Bush to deal energetically with the conflict.

 

While the chances for peace remain poor, this possibility at least justifies support for the Road Map.