

MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

A Guide to the Perplexed

Issue 1: Settlements and Disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza

Mark Rosenblum and Gidon D. Remba

Myth: The Sharon government's plan to relocate settlers from 17 settlements in Gaza and from 4 settlements from the West Bank, and to redeploy IDF troops from these areas, is bad for Israel.

- **FACT:** Prime Minister Sharon's commitment to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Gaza and parts of the West Bank reflects Israel's fundamental interests and places him squarely within the Israeli national consensus – a consensus that recognizes that settlements hurt Israel's security, economic prosperity, and demographic future. Implementation of Prime Minister Sharon's initiative can do much to improve Israeli security, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and create a new context more conducive to renewing negotiations.
- **FACT:** Poll after poll shows that **60% - 70% of Israelis support Sharon's disengagement plan**. A Dahaf/*Yedioth Ahronoth* survey conducted on May 13, 2004 found that 71% of Israelis were in favor of the plan, and only 24% were against. Even among Likud supporters, 63% supported the initiative, with 32% opposing. Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz recently stated that "Gaza is not the land of our forefathers" and that the Israeli presence in Gaza is an "historical error."



Myth: Perhaps the Israeli majority is wrong. The settlements are not a problem; they don't contribute to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

- **FACT:** IDF Chief of Staff Lt. General Moshe Ya'alon recently stated that "the settlements, far from serving a security purpose, were a security burden [to Israel]...he also blamed the settlements—and the military presence their defense requires—for exacerbating the tension between Israelis and Palestinians." (*The New Yorker*, May 31, 2004)



- **FACT:** 230,000 Jewish settlers now live among 3.5 million Palestinians who want to rule themselves in an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. The settler population (not including East Jerusalem) right after the signing of the Oslo peace accords in 1993 was about 100,000. At the end of the year 2000 it was more than 190,000, nearly double.¹ Just 7,500 Jewish settlers live among 1.3 million Palestinians now in Gaza; some 220,000 now live among over 2 million Palestinians in the West Bank.
- **FACT: Israeli Security Expert and Former Mossad Official Yossi Alpher:** “**Settlement expansion was a key catalyst of the first *Intifada*, the popular rebellion of Palestinian youth [against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the settlement enterprise there] that broke out in late 1987 and continued until the early 90’s, as well as of the *al-Aqsa Intifada*, in fall 2000.** More than any other factor, the spread of settlements on what they considered to be their lands was seen by Palestinian youth as a reason for urgent, even reckless action: to continue to struggle passively, as their elders advocated, was to cede Palestine to the settlers. **This dramatic expansion of settlement building to a state of critical mass, set against a backdrop of agonizingly slow progress in the Oslo process over a seven-year period, constituted a major catalyst for the *al-Aqsa Intifada*.**”²
- **FACT:** “**One of the major flaws of Oslo was that it did not explicitly prohibit continued expansion of settlements. This settlement growth established ‘facts on the ground’ that were used to preempt negotiations on territory and seriously eroded Palestinian trust in the peace process itself.**”³
- **FACT:** A radical minority of annexationist ideological settlers seeks to extend Israeli sovereignty over the entire West Bank and Gaza, permanently incorporating these areas into Israel. A survey commissioned by Peace Now found that **the vast majority of settlers—77%—chose to live in the occupied territories for ‘quality of life’ issues, not ideological or religious reasons, having moved to the territories thanks to generous financial incentives provided by the Israeli government. Most settlers, a moderate majority, are “suburban commuters” to jobs within Israel; if the government decided that Israel should withdraw from the areas in which they live, 83% would accept financial compensation and relocation back to Israel or to settlement blocs near the Green Line (1967 border) which could be incorporated into Israel under a peace agreement. 71% of settlers think that a peace agreement should be reached with the Palestinians.**⁴
 - **An overwhelming majority of Israelis—68%—supports dismantling most of the settlements in the occupied territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.**⁵
- **FACT:** Some 150 settlements, along with an additional 96 “outposts”—the nucleus of future settlements—now exist, many of which disrupt the territorial contiguity and viability of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza—precisely as the settlement movement and right-wing Likud leaders have acknowledged they sought to do since the mid-1970’s. **The continued expansion of settlements undermines Palestinian faith in the possibility of resolving the conflict with Israel through a two-state solution. Settlements represent a major obstacle to the possibility of a future peace.** (To view Peace Now’s Map of Settlements and Outposts, 1996 – October 2003, please visit <http://www.peacenow.org/outpostmap.jpg>)
- **FACT: Settlements Undermine Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State, Jeopardizing the Zionist Enterprise.** Israeli demographers project that by 2010 there will be more Arabs than Jews living between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, the area which now comprises Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, or the Land of Israel. If Israelis and Palestinians do not separate into two states—either by agreement or unilaterally—Israel will soon find itself ruling over a Palestinian Arab majority. As a result, Israel will effectively lose its Jewish majority, undermining its future as a democratic Jewish state, the heart of the Zionist enterprise. If Palestinians abandon hope in a two-state solution, and demand equal citizenship in Israel, the Jewish state will be faced with a dilemma: either continue to control millions of Palestinian

Arabs without granting them a state or equal citizenship rights, thereby undermining Israel's democratic character, or grant the demand for equal citizenship, and lose its Jewish majority and Jewish character.



- Most Israelis have come to recognize that Israel can't remain a Jewish democratic state and continue to control millions of Palestinians. **Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a Likud stalwart and the former mayor Jerusalem**, has warned that this problem must be avoided lest Israel become a pariah state and jeopardize its democratic Jewish future. Olmert believes that the only way to avoid this is for Israel to withdraw unilaterally, if it can't achieve a negotiated agreement, from the vast majority of the West Bank and all of Gaza, including some of the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, removing most of the settlements and relocating settlers to Israel or to areas most likely to become part of Israel in a future peace accord.
 - **"If we have to make a choice between a Jewish state and the whole of Israel, unfortunately I have to prefer a Jewish state and that means also dividing the land,"** said Olmert. "The radical right lives in a virtual reality," continued Olmert. "We need to take the initiative. Rather than depend on Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat's will to negotiate, we need to set the essential parameters for a solution. To do that, **we must withdraw to a different border than the one we keep today,**" Olmert said, stressing that **"painful compromises will have to be made, involving transfer of some settlers, because there is no other alternative."** **"Tens of thousands of settlers might have to move if Israel implements plans to separate itself from the Palestinians,"** explained Olmert. (*Ha'aretz*, 12/11/03, 12/21/03)



- More recently Olmert said that "The four settlements we evacuate in Samaria [the northern West Bank] will not be the last. If the process develops, we will evacuate many more - not because we want to but to reduce our daily altercations with the rest of the world. This is necessary if we want to remain a democratic, Jewish state. The occupation of Palestinian territory is eroding Israel's international standing." "The United States is virtually our only friend, so we must remember that it too supports a withdrawal almost to the borders of 1967," said Olmert. (*Jerusalem Post*, August 12, 2004, "Olmert: 'Many' West Bank settlements to be removed;" *Ha'aretz*, 8/12/04)
- Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said in a speech to Israel's National Security College: "We must not ignore the demographics. It is impossible to maintain a Jewish and democratic country here, over the years, while ruling over millions of Palestinians" in the West Bank and Gaza. (*NY Times*, 7/17/04; AFP, 7/16/04)

Israeli Disengagement from the West Bank After the Iraq War

- **Israeli Intelligence Officials: The Iraq War Changed the Strategic Equation—Israel No Longer Needs the West Bank Territory or Settlements for Security**
 - Israeli Security Expert and former Mossad official Yossi Alpher: “Thanks to the destruction of Saddam Hussein's army, Israel for the first time in its 56 year history no longer faces the danger of conventional attack by a coalition of Arab armed forces; indeed, taking into account the dilapidated state of the Syrian army, Israel faces no conventional war threat at all.”⁶
 - **“Efraim Halevy, a former head of the Mossad secret service...who also served as head of Sharon's National Security Council, said the [Sharon government's] willingness to remove settlements [under the disengagement plan] was connected to the U.S. toppling of Saddam Hussein, which removed the threat of attack from the east - one of the key reasons some in Israel wanted to hold on to the West Bank. ‘One has to reconsider the settlements in terms of their strategic (importance) as they are today, not as they were yesterday or the day before,’ Halevy said. ‘Strategic considerations ... change over the years.’”^{7*}**

Unilateral or Coordinated Disengagement?

FACT: President Bush has expressed strong support for Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement plan. But to prevent chaos the Bush Administration is insisting that Sharon coordinate the withdrawal with moderate Palestinian leaders. Despite the familiar slogans, there are indications that both Bush and Sharon have recognized the advantages of empowering an official Palestinian partner to assume security responsibility from areas Israel evacuates. A successful implementation will require the “unilateral” disengagement plan to gain regional and international cooperation and support. But it remains open to question whether Sharon will sufficiently coordinate the disengagement with moderate Palestinian leaders.

- In his letter to Prime Minister Sharon, the President noted that the proposed withdrawals may mark “real progress” toward realizing his June 24, 2002 vision, and could make “a real contribution to peace.” At the same time, President Bush has repeatedly assured Prime Minister Sharon, the Quartet, and the entire world that the United States remains committed to his June 24th vision and to the Road Map.
- **The Bush Administration, echoing the IDF Chief of Staff and other leading IDF generals, has expressed its belief that Israel should coordinate its withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank with the moderate Palestinian leadership** under Prime Minister Abu Ala, former Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan, and others. (To learn more about the Palestinian moderates and how Israel, the US, along with Egypt, Jordan and the EU can help strengthen them, see *Myths and Facts Issue #2: The Failure of the Road Map and Empowering Palestinian Moderates*.) By doing so Israel will help insure that Palestinian security forces take control of the evacuated areas and prevent Hamas and other extremist groups from taking over and using these areas as a launching pad for continued terror and violence against Israel. In preparation for an Israeli disengagement, Egypt and Jordan have offered to train Palestinian security forces, with Israel's consent, while Egypt, also with Israel's agreement, has committed to deploying its forces on the border with Gaza to stop the arms smuggling through tunnels following the Israeli withdrawal.

*To learn more about the settlements, please see *Myths and Facts Issue 6: How Israel's Settlements Dilemma Arose: A Capsule Summary*. That issue, which sketches the historical origins of Israel's settlements dilemma, includes sections on “The Impact of the Settlements on Israel's Quest for Security and Peace” and on “Longstanding U.S. Opposition to Settlements.”

- **“The Bush administration has asked Israel to try starting negotiations with any Palestinian empowered to take responsibility for the areas to be evacuated, to try to prevent a takeover by Islamic fundamentalists.”** Sharon’s former bureau chief and current special envoy Dov Weisglass regularly briefs “U.S. officials on Israel’s contacts with Egypt regarding new security arrangements on the southern end of the Gaza Strip, around the ‘Philadelphi road’ border zone. Egypt has been conducting separate talks with Sharon and with Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat in search of security stability in Gaza after an Israeli withdrawal.” (“Fearing Islamist Takeover, U.S. Urges Israel, PA Talks on Gaza,” *Ha’aretz*, 5/31/04)
- In mid-July 2004, while Labor leader Shimon Peres was meeting with Sharon to discuss the possibility of a national unity government with Labor to help secure a majority in the government for the disengagement plan, one of Labor’s three conditions for joining the government with the Likud was “an overture to some Palestinian officials to take part in the withdrawal.” **“Peres said Mr. Sharon seemed amenable to the idea of a Palestinian ‘partner’ in the disengagement, although he did not believe it could be Yasir Arafat.”** (*New York Times*, 7/19/04)[†]
- **Israeli press reports indicate that representatives of the Sharon government and the IDF have been meeting “secretly” with former Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan in an effort to coordinate security arrangements in Gaza after Israel disengages.**
- **According to a new survey of Israelis and Palestinians, majorities in both societies approve of the current Egyptian effort to turn Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan into a multilateral affair.** That is one of the key findings from a poll conducted in late June by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
 - **The survey found that 54% of Israelis and 64% of Palestinians generally support the Egyptian initiative**, while 39% of Israelis and 32% of Palestinians oppose it.
 - **Among Palestinians, there were high levels of support for some of the steps that their government would need to take under the plan, like unifying security services (81%) and appointing a strong Interior Minister (87%).**
 - **53% of Israelis and 60% of Palestinians support the deployment of an armed international force in Gaza that would be responsible for security at the Rafah border crossing and the Egyptian-Palestinian border.**
 - **52% of Israelis and 70% of Palestinians support an international presence aimed at rebuilding Palestinian Authority (PA) civil institutions.**
 - **While 59% of Palestinians support continued suicide bombings inside Israel if an opportunity arises, and 67% of Israelis back assassinations of suspected Palestinian terrorists if a chance occurs, 90% of Israelis and 79% of Palestinians support a mutual cessation of violence. If such cessation is obtained, 55% of Palestinians would support the PA taking measures to prevent further armed attacks on Israeli targets.**
 - **72% of Palestinians and 80% of Israelis support long-range reconciliation between the two peoples.**⁸

[†]For an analysis of Arafat’s intentions towards Israel, his role in the peace process and its collapse, see *Myths and Facts Issue #3: Palestinian Attitudes Towards Peace with Israel and the Question of Yasser Arafat*.

- Gaza Security Chief Mohammed “Dahlan and other Palestinian politicians sense beneath [Palestinian] militancy an exhaustion with death and despair and a hunger for change. ‘Enough is enough,’ said Dahlan” in a speech to the Women's Affairs Technical Committee of Palestine which gathered in June in a hotel conference room in Gaza City for a symposium titled “After the Withdrawal From Gaza.” Dahlan “asked if Palestine wanted to go the way of Iraq or Libya. Palestinians could either build a model in Gaza, or embrace ‘chaos and destruction.’... ‘We are at a junction,’ he said, ‘either to get to Palestinian independence, or to get back to Somalia,’” the disintegration of Palestinian society into warlordism and anarchy. (*New York Times*, 7/16/04)

Objection: Won't unilateral withdrawal from any territory or settlements send a message of Israeli weakness to the Palestinians, that Israel only understands the language of force, capitulates to terror and violence? Won't that simply increase the Palestinian motivation to pursue the war against Israel until total victory, much as Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in response to Hezbollah's attacks was viewed by some Palestinians as vindicating the Arab strategy of guerrilla warfare against Israel?

RESPONSE: While these are legitimate concerns, there are three strong countervailing considerations:

- **First, this analysis rests on a questionable understanding of the causes of the intifada and terror against Israel.** The intifada would likely have erupted even had Israel not withdrawn unilaterally from Lebanon. Its causes had mainly to do with the loss of Palestinian faith in diplomacy due to the failure of the negotiations process at Camp David, and with the fact that Israel allowed the Palestinians full control over only 18% of the West Bank during the entire Oslo decade. Moreover, Israel's continued expansion of settlements during that time and its refusal under both Netanyahu and Barak to implement many of the key provisions of the Oslo interim agreements, contributed to undermining Palestinian support for negotiations. In sum, most Palestinians felt the Oslo process promised much and delivered little in terms of independence, good government and an end to Israel's occupation.[‡]
 - Former US Ambassador and chief Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross reports in his memoir, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, that in the year before Camp David, then IDF Chief of Staff Lt. General Shaul Mofaz (now Sharon's Defense Minister) and Admiral Ami Ayalon, head of Israel's Shin Bet internal security service, implored him to drop US efforts to reach a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty and “put all our emphasis on reaching an agreement with the Palestinians—and to convince Barak of the importance of this.” “Both feared,” Ross writes, “that at some point Palestinian frustrations, especially on the street over corruption in the Palestinian Authority and the failure of Oslo to end the Israeli occupation, would boil over and there would be an eruption of violence.”
- **The Fatah-Hamas-Islamic Jihad Truce Agreement: Second,** while Hamas would like Israel to withdraw under fire in order to raise its cachet as a “resistance group,” and will continue its efforts to attack Israel until the withdrawal is completed, **Palestinian responses to Israel's proposed disengagement from Gaza suggest that a withdrawal of settlers and troops from that area could create a new dynamic which could significantly reduce or end Palestinian violence against Israel from Gaza.** The *Jerusalem Post* reports that “Jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti has reached an agreement with Hamas and Islamic Jihad officials in Damascus to end all attacks from the Gaza Strip after the IDF withdraws, Palestinian sources said on Monday. The 18-point plan calls on terrorists to give up their weapons after the pullout, participants in the negotiations said.” Under the agreement, “Gunmen would be allowed to join the security forces, but would have to sever their ties with terrorist groups. The plan also calls for sweeping government reform, and municipal elections within six months

[‡]For documentation on Palestinian attitudes towards peace with Israel, see *Myths and Facts Issue 3: Palestinian Attitudes Towards Peace with Israel and the Question of Yasser Arafat*, and *Issue 4: Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed: A Way Out of Israel's Current Impasse*.

of the withdrawal.” Israeli coordination of security arrangements and the terms of the disengagement itself with Palestinian political and security forces will increase the likelihood that such steps will be realized on the Palestinian side after Israel leaves Gaza (and then parts of the West Bank).

- Hamas and Fatah honored a *hudna*, or unilateral cease-fire, in the summer of 2003. The *hudna* broke down in no small part because the Sharon government chose not to reciprocate, instead continuing offensive military operations and targeted killings. These operations led to a renewal of retaliatory attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, causing the cease-fire to collapse. Were both Israel and the PA security forces to honor a bilateral truce following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and if Egypt does its part to prevent arms smuggling into Gaza, a new truce could last.
- **If Israel takes further steps to coordinate security arrangements and an orderly transition of governmental authority to responsible Palestinian political and security forces in Gaza, the odds increase significantly that Israel’s disengagement from Gaza will enhance its security and lead to a stable truce.**
- **Third, Israel must weigh the overall potential strategic costs and benefits of any action it contemplates. In fact, the number of Israeli casualties since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon has been dramatically reduced when compared to the period of Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon.** Israel has made clear, in both word and deed, that Hezbollah violations of the international border between Lebanon and Israel will be met, at Israel’s discretion, by powerful Israeli retaliatory responses on Lebanon and Syria, which effectively controls Lebanon. Most Israeli military strategists now believe that Israel has enhanced its deterrent posture against Hezbollah on the Lebanon-Israel border, not weakened it, and that Israel has successfully deterred Hezbollah from serious escalation of warfare in that arena. Some critics may persist in believing that Israel sent a message of weakness to Hezbollah and the Arab world. But the reality on the ground suggests otherwise. This has not prevented Hezbollah from engaging in increasingly brazen support for Palestinian suicide attacks from the West Bank into Israel, including the August 2004 double bus bombing in Beersheva. But an effective coordinated disengagement which empowered Palestinian moderates to enforce security in areas Israel evacuates would reduce Hezbollah’s opportunity to partner with Palestinian terrorists.
- A withdrawal of IDF forces and settlers from Gaza, and from most of the West Bank, coordinated by Israel with Palestinian forces willing to take security responsibility for evacuated areas, bears significant strategic political and security advantages for Israel. A coordinated disengagement is far preferable for Israeli security than a purely unilateral one, as IDF generals and the IDF Chief of Staff have stressed in their public comments. A successful coordinated disengagement, which would result in a stable truce and an end to arms smuggling, is far better for Israel than the current status quo of terrorism and Qassam rockets fired often on Israeli settlements and towns. It will save Israeli lives and could strengthen Palestinian moderates and reformers, paving the way for a renewed negotiating process.

To learn more, please see other issues of Myths and Facts About the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict:

Issue 1: Settlements and Disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza (current issue)

Issue 2: The Failure of the Road Map and Empowering Palestinian Moderates

Issue 3: Palestinian Attitudes Towards Peace with Israel and the Question of Yasser Arafat

Issue 4: Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed: A Way Out of Israel’s Current Impasse

Issue 5: Objections to Peace Now: The Fence and Disengagement

Issue 6: How Israel’s Settlements Dilemma Arose: A Capsule Summary

To learn more about Peace Now’s approach to security through peace for Israel, please visit <http://www.chicagopeacenow.org/> and <http://www.peacenow.org/>

Chicago Peace Now, the Chicago-area affiliate of Americans for Peace Now (APN), is a Zionist organization that affirms the right of Israel to exist in peace and security as a democratic Jewish state. We believe that the only durable settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a two-state solution between Israel and a territorially and economically viable non-militarized Palestinian state. Shalom Achshav—Peace Now—was founded in 1978 by 348 reserve officers of the Israel Defense Forces who believed that only a negotiated end to the conflict in the Middle East could bring true security to Israel and her people.

Comments welcome at contactus@chicagopeacenow.org

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Mark Rosenblum is the Founder and Policy Director of Americans for Peace Now (APN), the leading American Jewish organization promoting Middle East peace, and the sister organization of Israel's Shalom Achshav movement. Mr. Rosenblum is also a historian at Queens College of the City University where he is the Director of the Michael Harrington Center and head of its Middle East Project.


Mr. Rosenblum has spoken and written extensively as a Middle East political analyst. His radio and television appearances include The Larry King Live Show, CBS and NBC evening news, CNN, and National Public Radio; he is currently a Middle East analyst for MSNBC. His most recent writings have been featured in the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Chicago Tribune*, *Boston Globe*, *Miami Herald*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and the *Washington Jewish Week*. He has been frequently cited as a Middle East expert and quoted by leading newspapers including the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post* and *Ha'aretz*. He is completing two forthcoming books, *Two Jerusalems, One Peace: Capitalizing on Reality* and with Gidon D. Remba co-editing *From Baghdad to Jerusalem: A New Road to Middle East Peace?* In 1999, the *Forward* newspaper selected Mr. Rosenblum as one of the fifty most influential American Jews.

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Mr. Remba served as Senior Foreign Press Translator in the Israel Prime Minister's Office from 1977-1978 during the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace process. He translated the Knesset speeches of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, as well as Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and other Israeli leaders for the foreign press during the period from Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem until the Camp David Peace Accords. He co-translated Sadat's Knesset speech into English for the world press.

To learn more, please visit <http://www.chicagopeacenow.org/bureau.html#GDR>

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West Bank Settlements and Outposts, January 2002

¹Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

²Joseph Alpher, "Settlements and Borders in Israeli-Palestinian Relations," *Expanding the Conversation*, Issue 2, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 2001, pp. 5-10.

³APN Policy Paper "Justifying and Structuring An Extraordinary Aid Package for Israel" at <http://www.peacenow.org/LnGrntees/policypaper.html>

⁴Americans for Peace Now (APN) Press Release, July 23, 2002, at <http://www.peacenow.org/nia/pr/07232003.html>

⁵Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Opinion Survey Press Release, July 4, 2004, at <http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p12ejoint.html>

⁶Yossi Alpher, Weekly APN Q & A, March 8, 2004

⁷Associated Press, January 7, 2004.

⁸APN Middle East Peace Report, July 12, 2004, at <http://www.peacenow.org/nia/peace/v5i48.html> and see survey press release at <http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p12ejoint.html>