The Canard of Democratic Peace
By
Gidon D. Remba
The Jerusalem Report, September 25, 2000
With
Israel and the Palestinians having failed to consummate a
final peace accord at Camp
David, we are witnessing a
grand revival of the nostrum that only democracies can establish genuine
peace. Its new high priest is none
other than revered human rights icon Natan Sharansky. While
confessing that he does not wish Israel to rule over another people, Sharansky
insists that Israel should withhold concessions for peace treaties from repressive
undemocratic regimes like Arafat's.
"A country that respected the rights of its own people would also
respect the rights of its neighbors," Sharansky
has explained in the Wall Street Journal. "A repressive regime would always need
internal and external enemies to justify its policies, and would therefore
always pose a threat to peace…[and] eventually
threaten the security of my people."
Israel, he maintains, must link its concessions to the
degree of liberalization of its neighbors:
no democracy, no peace.
While
this pithy slogan is beguiling, Sharansky has got it
backwards. Reaching a historic
compromise with the Palestinians is no guarantee that they will democratize,
but obstructing the peace process is the surest way to perpetuate the
conditions which make for internal repression, fanaticism and violence. Nor is the Jewish state itself
immune to this dynamic. As long as Israel has remained in a state of siege, it has fallen
short of granting full civic equality to its Palestinian Arab citizens, despite
their formal equality before the law.
Only in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords has the country undergone a
quiet, still incomplete, revolution in its treatment of its Arab minority, and
towards West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. Meanwhile, the smug self-congratulation
about Israeli democracy has obscured the fact that keeping Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty means flouting the
democratic choices of some 200,000 Palestinian Arabs in East Jerusalem, who have long refused Israeli citizenship and
rarely vote in Israeli municipal elections.
The
tactic of linking international agreements to an adversary's human rights
performance which helped free him from a Soviet prison camp has led Sharansky astray in Israel. Had he
served in Menachem Begin's
government twenty-two years ago, his logic would have compelled him to oppose a
peace treaty with Egypt. Egypt has often been ranked as unfree
by Freedom House, an organization that promotes democracy and human rights
worldwide, with an abysmal political rights index of 6 on a scale of 1 to 7,
among the lowest in the world. Its civil
liberties index hovers between 5 and 6 out of 7. Egypt’s imprisonment last month, of Saad
al-Din Ibrahim, an Egyptian-American critic of
government electoral fraud and promoter of voting rights, is only the latest
example of its rank disdain for democratic openness. Had Sharansky's way
prevailed at the first Camp
David summit, it is
doubtful that Israel would have enjoyed the prosperity and freedom from full-scale war that
peace with Egypt has provided for two decades.
What's
more, the character of a regime is no indication of its propensity to wage
aggressive war in pursuit of economic and geopolitical interests, regional or
global power. The United States was a great liberal constitutional democracy, in the
midst of a civil rights revolution to boot, when it was at the apex of
prosecuting a war in Vietnam that even former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
concedes was unjust.
The
argument that Arab states will not maintain lasting peaceful relations with Israel until they become liberal democracies is also the
rhetorical stock in trade of Benjamin Netanyahu and Likud
leader Ariel Sharon. But this bromide of
"democratic peace" has been called into serious question by many
students of political history—most recently Princeton political scientist Joanne Gowa, in Ballots and Bullets: The
Elusive Democratic Peace. Gowa shows that both democratic and nondemocratic
governments have demonstrated a preference for nonviolent methods of conflict
resolution, thanks not to their moral appeal but to the relative cost of war
versus peaceful resolution of disputes.
She has established that the absence of war between liberal democracies
is limited only to the Cold War period after 1945, and is better explained by a
convergence of strategic political interests than by common domestic political
norms.
It
follows that democratic and autocratic countries may well form enduring
relations in which conflicts are resolved without force if there is a
sufficiently robust network of interests reinforcing such conduct. Squelching a just resolution of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the name of democracy is a cynical and tragic
mistake. Sharansky,
and those who will follow his lead, would have Israel pay a dear price for continued worship of
shibboleths.