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What is Zionism?
A Peace Now Vision
Gidon D. Remba[1]
“You shall be called the city of righteousness, the
faithful city.
Zion shall be redeemed with justice.” Isaiah I: 26-27
What
is Zionism? Zionism is the belief that Israel has a right to exist as a democratic Jewish
state—nothing more, nothing less. It is
the national liberation movement of the Jewish people. Zionism, like any form of nationalism, has
found expression on the left, right and center of the political spectrum. All Zionists share the common denominator of
commitment to the existence and flourishing of a Jewish state called Israel.
Progressive Zionism is best expressed by three whose life and work reflect the
balance of universal and particular, the love of Israel and the Jewish people, and the love of peace and
justice, common to the Biblical prophets, representing authentic Jewish
values: Theodor Herzl, Ahad Ha’am, and Israel’s Chief Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak. Each
embodies dimensions of our Zionism.[2]
The Zionism of Peace Now draws on the progressive, humane outlook of Theodor Herzl, the founder
of political Zionism. It was Herzl who
urged in Old-New Land (1902), “Hold fast to the things
that have made us great: to liberality,
tolerance, love of mankind. Only then is
Zion truly Zion.”[3] Herzl foresaw a Jewish state in which Jews
and Arabs enjoyed full equality as citizens.
The Zionism of Peace Now entails both a love for the Jewish people, a
passion for its well-being, and a commitment to justice, equality, liberal democracy
and human rights—cosmopolitan values.
“For Herzl the fortunes of Zionism and those of European liberalism were
intertwined. Old-New Land was a … blue-print for a liberal New Society in Palestine.”[4] We fight for Arab-Israeli peace and a more
equalitarian society in Israel out of a recognition that a
just and well-crafted political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
and the larger Arab-Israeli dispute, will enhance Israel’s security, fortifying it economically, politically
and socially. And we struggle to realize
these ideals because they are at the core of our moral vision as Zionists. In our Zionism there is no contradiction
between our belief in the justice of a state which embodies Jewish culture and
symbols in its public life, reflecting the heritage and needs of the Jewish
people, and our embrace of universal moral values.
Ahad Ha’am (which means “one of the people”), the pen
name of Asher Ginsburg, founded what is known as Cultural Zionism, the idea
that Jews should come together in the historic Land of Israel so that they can
cooperatively build what will become the common cultural center of the Jewish
people throughout the world, forming a collective space that is Jewish. Herzl and Ahad Ha’am represented two
contrasting approaches to Zionism in their day, the one focusing on
state-building, the other on creating a Jewish cultural and spiritual center in
the Land of Israel for all Jews everywhere, reviving Hebrew and the moral core of Judaism.
But their ideas can be united, particularly now that political Zionism has
achieved its primary goal of establishing a Jewish state.[5] Ahad Ha’am sought to establish not only “a
state of the Jews,” which he saw as Herzl’s goal, but a “Jewish state” animated
by Jewish spiritual and moral values.[6]
For Ahad Ha’am, Jewish national aspirations can only
be realized “while maintaining respect for the feelings and rights of the
region’s Arabs.”[7] Jews, cautioned Ahad
Ha’am, “should not forget that for the Arabs too, Palestine was a national home.”[8] Indeed, in a famous essay titled “Truth from
the Land of Israel,” written from Jerusalem
in 1891, “he was the first Zionist…to raise the question of the Arabs” of Palestine.[9] He made the “call for a decent treatment of Palestine’s Arabs” essential not only to the resurrection of Zion and the Zionist enterprise, but to the future of
Judaism itself, which was to become “the civic religion of a future Israel.”[10] Ahad Ha’am stresses that following the
universal principle of love and respect for the other does not commit the Jew
to self-abnegation—or what might be called today, self-hatred or
self-denial. On the contrary, because it
commands the Jew to love himself, and to love others no less, it obligates him
to fulfill his individual and national identity to the fullest extent that is
consistent with the demands of justice.
The same idea is expressed in Rabbi Hillel’s maxim, from Pirke Avot, “If
I am not for myself, what am I for; but if I am only for myself, what am I?”[11] Ahad Ha'am also maintained that the most
fundamental principle of Jewish ethics—"You shall love your neighbor as
yourself" (Leviticus 19:18)—does not teach us to love our neighbor more than ourselves, but as much: "The true meaning of the verse is:
'Self-love must not be allowed to incline the scale on the side of your own
advantage; love your neighbor as yourself, and then justice will necessarily
decide, and you will do nothing to your neighbor that you would consider a
wrong if it were done to yourself'… Judaism cannot accept the altruistic
principle; it cannot put 'other' in the centre of the circle, because that
place belongs to justice, which knows no distinction
between 'self' and 'other.'"[12] Some critics allege that the Love Thy
Neighbor Principle in the Torah strictly refers only to one's own countrymen,
so that a Jew’s neighbors in a Jewish state would be his fellow Jews. The text itself gives
the lie to this thesis,
a scant fifteen verses later: (Lev. 9: 30 - 34): “When a stranger resides with you in your
land, you shall not wrong him. The
stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.”
It was Ahad Ha’am who spoke of the relationship
between Jewish nationalism and Jewish ethics, both of which comprise our
Zionism, in an essay called “The Character of Judaism”:
The
Jewish law of justice is not confined within the narrow sphere of individual
relations. In its Jewish sense the
precept ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ can be carried out by a whole
nation in its dealings with other nations.
For this precept does not oblige a nation to sacrifice its life or its
position for the benefit of other nations.
It is, on the contrary, the duty of every nation, as of every individual
human being, to live and to develop to the utmost limit of its powers; but at
the same time it must recognize the right of other nations to fulfill the like
duty without let or hindrance.
Patriotism—that is, national egoism—must not induce it to disregard
justice, and to seek self-fulfillment through the destruction of other nations.[13]
There
are different forms of Zionism. One form
stresses Jewish national self-aggrandizement at the expense of the Jewish
commitment to equality, justice and liberal values. The other Zionism balances our duties to our
selves and our own nation with our universal commitments, in the belief that
one can love and give preference in special ways to one’s own people while also
promoting equality, justice and respect for all, Jew and non-Jew alike, in
Israel. One such preference is Israel’s Jewish public culture, expressing the historical
memory and national identity of its Jewish majority; another is the Law of
Return which allows any Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen. Our pursuit of peace and justice arises not
only from our embrace of Biblically-inspired moral imperatives, but from our
own self-interest as a Jewish nation and people: our well-being and security requires that we
strive to live with our Arab neighbors in peace and justice, helping Israel and
our fellow Jews there to work towards just and peaceful relations with
them.
While
Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, our
liberation is impossible without the concomitant flourishing of Palestinian
political and cultural life in a state living at peace next to Israel, whose
people should be treated with full respect and equality when they are citizens
of Israel.
Israel as a Democratic Jewish State: Chief Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak
Israel's
Declaration of Independence, “anticipated and boldly confronted the possible
tension between the Law of Return and the principle of equality,” between
Israel’s pursuit of the Jewish national project and its commitment to equal
citizenship for Jews and Arabs alike, embracing both in the same
paragraph: “The State of Israel will be
open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will
foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants;
it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of
Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all
its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will be faithful to
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” “In other words, the
nation's founders saw no inherent contradiction between the exigencies of
creating a Jewish state, the values of the prophets, and international
principles of human rights."[14]
Chief
Justice Aharon Barak explains that Israel’s “declaration of independence called
to ‘the children of the Arab nation living in the Land of Israel to keep the
peace and take part in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal
citizenship.’ Zionism was not based on discrimination against non-Jews, but on
their integration into the Jewish national home. Zionism was born as a response
against discrimination and racism. Certainly the values of the State of Israel
as a democratic state stand opposed to discrimination and demand equality.
Indeed, the democratic state is obliged to honor the basic rights of every
individual in the state to equality, and to protect them. But equality is a complex right. Treating
individuals in a different manner does not always imply treating them in a
discriminatory manner, and nor does treating individuals in an identical manner
automatically imply treating them in an equal manner.”
“The claim is heard,” notes Barak, “that this
application of the principle of equality between Jews and Arabs spells the end
of Zionism, or that it embodies a post-Zionist attitude. Nothing could be further from the truth. Zionism is not based on discrimination
between Jews and Arabs. That is not how the declaration of independence saw it
when it called on ‘the children of the Arab nation who live in the State of
Israel to keep the peace and assume their share in the building of the state on
the basis of full and equal citizenship’; that is not how the founding fathers,
Theodor Herzl, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, David Ben-Gurion and others, saw it when they
repeatedly emphasized that the Jewish state was a state in which full equality
between Jews and Arabs would prevail; that is not how the Supreme Court saw it
from its earliest days, when it repeatedly emphasized equality between citizens
of the state on the basis of religion, race and gender. Of course, the
principle of equality itself, by its essence, permits — in cases where
circumstances require it — differing but non-discriminatory treatment among
equals, such that it is permissible to infringe on equality under certain
defined conditions.”[15]
“The
values of Judaism and democracy have broad jurisprudential importance in Israel,” continues Barak.
“They have constitutional status, influencing both the determination of
the extent of human rights and the protection accorded them in Israeli
jurisprudence. The phrase ‘the values of
the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ entered into Israeli law
in 1992 with the enactment of two Basic Laws governing, respectively, freedom
of occupation and human dignity and freedom. The Basic Laws, 11 in total, serve
as the de facto constitution of Israel. Israel's Jewish and democratic values are accorded
supralegal-constitutional status and serve as a legal yardstick by which to
measure the applicability of the Basic Laws.”
“Only
a national home built on foundations of equality and respect for the individual
can endure over time,” concludes Israel’s Chief Justice.
“Only a state that relates in an equal manner to all its children can
win acceptance in the society of freedom-loving nations. Only a society based
on principles of equality can live in peace with itself.”
“There
is no contradiction between striving to grant the Arabs equality as required by
law and decency and the fulfillment of Zionism,” said Israel’s Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein, who happens
also to be an Orthodox Jew. “Whoever
wants to preserve Israel as a democratic and Jewish state must strive to grant equality to the
Arabs.”[16] "Israel is the state of the Jewish people," notes
Israeli Cabinet Minister Dan Meridor, "but because it is a Jewish state,
it must not practice against its non-Jewish citizens the kind
of discrimination to which Jews were subjected in the diaspora."[17] Our Israel is both a Jewish and a liberal
democratic state, and liberal democracy requires equality among all citizens,
Jewish or Palestinian, in the domestic public sphere where the government acts,
when it provides education, allocates budget and land, regulates employment,
assesses taxes, and imposes the duty on citizens to serve the state through
national service.
In
our Zionism, realizing equality for all Israel’s citizens by no means compromises Israel's unique character as a Jewish nation-state. Israel can remain the guardian of the interests of the
Jewish people and be a well-spring of its cultural and religious renewal, as Israel’s Chief Justice Aharon Barak continues to urge:[18]
In a speech entitled 'The State of Israel as a Jewish
and Democratic State,' Barak outlined the characteristics that make Israel a Jewish state.
'It is a state to which every Jew has a right to immigrate and in which
the ingathering of exiles is a basic value,' said Barak. '...a state whose
history is intermixed and enmeshed with the history of the Jewish people, whose
language is Hebrew, and whose holidays reflect the Jewish heritage. A Jewish
state is a state where Jewish settlement in the countryside, cities and rural
settlements is the prime concern...a state which preserves the memory of the
Jews who were slaughtered in the Holocaust...A Jewish state is a state which
encourages Jewish culture and education and love for the Jewish people. A
Jewish state is the realization of the hope of generations for the redemption
of Israel. A Jewish state is a state whose values are the
freedom, justice, honesty and peace which are part of the Jewish heritage. A
Jewish state is a state whose values include those which emanate from the
religious tradition. The Bible is the most fundamental of its books, and the
prophets are the foundation of its morality...a state in which Jewish law has
an important function...where the values of the Bible, the values of Jewish
heritage and the values of the Halacha make up part of the fundamental values.'
Aharon
Barak’s is our Zionism. In our Zionism,
there is no contradiction between Israel as a democratic Jewish state and Israel as a state of its citizens.[19] Speaking of the Law of Return, Israel’s ties with the Jewish Diaspora, and the maintenance
of a Jewish majority, Alan Dowty notes that “None of these features is
inherently inconsistent with liberal democracy, and none of them are in fact
unique to Israel. There are at least two dozen ethnic democracies in
the world (among several dozen ethnic states), and a large number of states
grant citizenship on the basis of ethnic identity or descent.”[20] Observes Israeli constitutional law scholar
Ruth Gavison: “The Jewishness of Israel
is, first and foremost, the recognition of the fact that Israel is the state in which the Jewish people
exercises its right to national self-determination. Many of the world’s
democracies, old and new, have a distinct culture analogous to Israel’s Jewish culture. The
constitutions of most European countries reveal that they are nation-states in
this sense. These states celebrate their
distinct histories, languages, identities, and emblems. Many of their citizens do not share this
nationality. But so long as the rights
of these citizens are not denied, and so long as they can participate fully in
the political and civil life of their societies, we do not deny the democratic
nature of the state.”[21]
It
escapes right-wing Zionists like Yoram Hazony in his flawed volume The Jewish State: The
Struggle for Israel's Soul,[22]
that post-Zionism is a field of many colors, a hybrid of historical revision,
cultural criticism and normative political recommendations. One may harvest from among its fruits while leaving some of its lands fallow; one may
cleave to its goal of inclusion and democratization, while dissenting not only
over the means to this end but over its very meaning. There is no clash between Israel's remaining
a haven for persecuted Jews, or inviting free Jewish immigration under the Law
of Return, and its becoming fully a state of all its citizens. Critics on the ultra-nationalist right, like
their radical post-Zionist antipodes—purists who rail against the very fact of
Jewish power rather than its unjust application—would impale Israel on one or
the other horn of a false dilemma.[23]
Hazony
seems tone deaf to the need for fulfilling the promise of equal citizenship for
the Arabs of Israel, as codified in its Declaration of Independence. If he is genuinely troubled by the
Palestinization of Israel's Arab community, and the prospect that Palestinian
national identity will translate into a secessionist movement, why does Hazony
consistently fail to champion large-scale efforts to remove the stain of social
and material privation from its Arab population? Does he seriously expect a minority long
discriminated against by the state in housing, education, job opportunity,
urban development, economic support, and basic social services will display
undying fealty?[24] He who seeks the abiding loyalty of this
community should praise the first steps at fuller inclusion which Israel has
taken, including the elevation of an Arab judge to Israel's Supreme Court, the
participation of Arab Knesset Members in the Defense and Foreign Affairs
Committee, rising government budget allocations for Arab municipalities under
Labor during some of the Oslo years, Supreme Court rulings affirming equality
for Arabs in the allocation of land, and encourage other far more dramatic
steps. Because Hazony has failed to
face this ineluctable problem, he cannot accomplish the task he has set
himself: refurbishing the idea of the
Jewish state. "There is no way of
resolving the ongoing debate on the relationship between 'Jewish' and 'Israeli'
without first resolving the question of the relation between the Israeli Jew
and the Israeli Arab, the question of 'who is an Israeli,'" as David
Grossman sagely notes in Sleeping on a
Wire: Conversations with Palestinians in Israel[25],
a chronicle which remains required reading for anyone hoping to rededicate the
Jewish state with lasting oil, without relying on miracles. By dismissing the Oslo peace process as the
child of post-Zionist flight from the image of a Jewish nation-state—as if most
of its supporters were not in fact Zionists—Hazony displays a tin ear for equal
citizenship, equal respect for all, as the true source of the struggle for
Israeli-Palestinian peace. If West Bank and Gaza Palestinians cannot enjoy such equal status as Israeli
citizens, a result neither side wishes, they must be afforded the chance to
secure it in their own polity in the territory where they reside.
Jews
form the majority in Israel’s national society, and so they represent the
prevailing culture, just as in the peaceful Palestinian state which as Zionists
we are committed to help realize, Palestinian Arabs will form the majority, and
a Palestinian culture, infused by the Islamic values of the largely Muslim
population, will reflect the dominant culture of Muslim Palestinians in that
area. The draft constitution of the
future state of Palestine defines it as a Muslim Arab state, while
guaranteeing relative freedom of religion, and equal civil and political rights
to all Palestinian citizens.[26] And just as Israel gives preference to Jews wishing to emigrate to it,
under the Law of Return, so the state of Palestine will have a Palestinian Law of Return, which gives
preference to Palestinians, especially Palestinian refugees, to emigrate into the new state.
Both states, Israel and Palestine, will ultimately contain minorities, and in both the
minorities must be treated with full equality before the law. The education
systems and public cultures of both societies should promote equal respect in
the public and private interaction of all people with one another.
Our
Zionism strives to forge a common civic post-national culture which both Jews
and Palestinian Arabs can share equally in the Jewish state of Israel, and in relations between Israel and the state of Palestine. With Herzl,
Ahad Ha’am and Aharon Barak, it understands the moral limits of the national
thread in Zionism, recognizing the imperative of a cooperative, common identity
to complement—not replace—the national identity inherent in Zionism. And because, on our Zionism, both states
should seek to develop such a common civic egalitarian public culture to
complement the particularistic aspects of their national cultures, they will
draw from their own cultures in the articulation of that common public culture
to be shared by Jews and Arabs in Palestine-Israel. Our Zionism sees not only two states, living
in peace side by side, it sees the Palestinian citizens of Israel enjoying full
equality legally, economically and socially in a Jewish republic, as it does
Jews, Christians and other minorities eventually living in full equality with
Muslim Palestinians in a Palestinian Arab republic in the West Bank and
Gaza.
In
the Jewish republic, Israel, Palestinian citizens should have equal civic
responsibilities and enjoy equal civic benefits. Equal civic duties means
national service for all citizens, including eventually, when conditions
permit, service for all Israeli citizens in the Israel Defense Forces, which
will, with the full realization of our Zionism, no longer face a neighboring
Arab army with which it is likely to be at war. Israel’s current president, formerly a Likud
Member of Knesset, and previous Labor prime ministers have proposed instituting
national service for all citizens of Israel, Jewish and Arab.[27] Our Zionism works assiduously to attenuate
armed national conflict and to establish a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace. Our struggle for peace will also
help remove the main obstacle to equal civic duties and benefits for Israeli
Jews and Israeli Palestinians, the ongoing national conflict. Indeed, we can work to reduce these obstacles
to fuller equality between Jews and Arabs in Israeli society even now as part
of our larger mission to seek peace and justice.
From
the Two-State Solution to A Third Way
With
these changes, a regional security force protecting Palestine-Israel as a whole
might one day become possible in the distant future, akin to a NATO to which
individual nation states in the region each contribute forces. Israel’s contribution to this regional force would include
both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis.
This may be a goal far off in the future, but it is a goal towards which
our Zionism obliges us to work.
For
a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to succeed, both
Israelis and Palestinians must begin to overcome the zero-sum game thinking
inherent in nineteenth-century mythologies of nationalism and the absolutely
sovereign nation-state. Many
contemporary nation-states no longer see sovereignty in such terms, recognizing
that the world has become more interdependent, and that independence coexists
with globalism in markets, media, culture and human rights norms in political
and legal practice. Sovereignty
represents a set of attributes which not only can be, but are, unbundled in
many countries.[28] In a zero-sum game, players view all facets
of sovereignty as non-negotiable, so that variations in the degree of a given
state power are treated as fundamental infringements by the other party on the
right to national self-determination in an independent state. An analogous fallacy is reflected in the view
that government regulation of markets violates economic liberty, when in fact
the free market could not function well, or at all, if the government did not
prevent monopolies or remedy excess inequities which, left unchecked, would
undermine the market system itself. By
the same token, a necessary trade-off between elements of sovereignty is
regarded as an affront to self-government, rather than a realistic
accommodation reflecting the way sovereign powers are often unavoidably
distributed elsewhere. A classical two-state solution involves creating two
fully sovereign countries in an arid patch lacking in natural resources that is
little more than fifty miles wide, the breadth of Chicago and its suburbs. If
the twenty-first century is to avoid reprising the tragedies of the past, now
with catastrophic weapons of mass destruction in the hands of fundamentalists,
we must start thinking more and more in post-national terms, even while
maintaining our national commitments, as Zionists and Palestinian
nationalists. Israel/Palestine is a
corner of the globe where such new models may be needed most, if only for the
very survival of the two nation-states. The
kind of future Palestinians and Israelis should begin to construct is neither a
single "bi-national" state, nor a conventional two-state arrangement,
but an alternative in between, a third way, evolving over time, and by mutual
consent. It must begin as two
nation-states, which is the unmistakable will of both peoples[29],
and evolve towards nation-states in a regional confederation. Both peoples would maintain continued
allegiance to their own nation-states, largely self-governing, but start to
move toward devolving some elements of national sovereignty into a cooperative
supra-national regional political structure, with some similarities to the
European Union. Water, environmental
safety, and security are ultimately regional problems which Palestinians and
Israelis are going to have to address together; there will be many more challenges
where regional cooperation will prove inescapable.
While
such notions may seem reminiscent of Shimon Peres’ controversial “new Middle East,”
they differ in several important respects. Peres sought to base Israeli-Arab peace
agreements on a regional security system and economic integration encompassing
most or all Arab states; he described the “ultimate goal” as being “the
creation of a regional community of nations, with a common market and elected
centralized bodies, modeled on the European Community.”[30] This is far too ambitious. Moreover, the notion of a regional community
for the entire Middle East, or just for Israel and a number of Arab states, even if pursued
gradually as Peres suggested, was unwelcome to both Egypt and Syria. Syrian
President Hafez Assad believed “that his regime can cope with the effects of
peace and limited normalization with Israel,” but not with economic and political integration
with Israel.[31]
Indeed, “Assad’s difficulties with this very approach were an important element
in the subsequent failure to achieve a breakthrough.”[32] Even Peres, to his credit, recognized that
“the road is long and difficult, and even in the West people sometimes takes
two steps backward for every step forward.
In the Middle East, as in Eastern Europe, the
process is far more complex; people are not yet ready to accept a
[transnational]…identity.”[33] Peres envisioned a
“Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli ‘Benelux’ for
economic affairs.”[34] But Palestinian-Israeli economic cooperation
may be inadvisable for the foreseeable future for reasons similar to those
which led Egypt and Syria to demur, particularly given the wide disparities
between the Palestinian and Israeli economies.
Still, some forms of cooperation between Palestine and Israel will prove impossible to avoid, and acceptable to
both parties in the first phase after a peace treaty. Palestinians and Israelis will have to crawl
before they can walk; but they will be unable to address problems of water and
environment, for example, unless they crawl, and walk, together. The
cooperative arrangements which emerge should serve as a model for future joint
institutions.
A
classical two-state framework may serve only to feed revanchist nationalist
sentiments, leading to renewed ethno-national conflict rather than to a stable peace.
We must foster a countervailing force, one which stresses the values of
regional cooperation and civic equality. Attachments to the sacred space and
time of history and place, rootedness in ancestral family homes and tribal
symbolism—whether by refugees insisting they can only return to their long-lost
villages in Israel, or by settlers who demand to live everywhere their
collective national memory was forged and to extend Israeli sovereign rule to
every such area—must be tempered and transformed by new commitments to a shared
political identity nourished by the ideal of equal citizenship. Rather than an intifada for winning
Palestinian sovereignty over a holy mosque called Al-Aksa, placing both
politics and law in the service of religion, we need a joint
Israeli-Palestinian struggle for casting off the shibboleths and illusions of absolute
national sovereignty itself. This is the
hidden secret of human rights and international justice struggling to break
free amidst the pious inflammatory nationalisms roiling the waters and sands of
Palestine, Israel and the Middle East today.
To
learn more about Zionism see Recommended Reading: Books, on the Chicago Peace
Now website.
[1]Gidon
D. Remba is President of Chicago Peace Now, an affiliate of Americans for Peace
Now, which supports Israel's
largest peace group, Shalom Achshav. This essay is excerpted from a more
comprehensive study of Zionism and post-Zionism by the author, titled “We Are
All Post-Zionists Now: Israel
as a Jewish and Democratic State.”
[2]Each
express progressive Zionism in different degrees and imperfectly. In both The Jewish State (1896) and Old-New
Land, Herzl betrays a preference for a “democratic monarchy and an
aristocratic republic” as his ideal form of government, and is unable to
imagine the revival of the Hebrew language in a Jewish state in the Land
of Israel. In these and other respects, Herzl leaves
much to be desired both in his commitment to liberalism, and to Jewish
nationalism. Theodor Herzl, The
Jewish State, Silvie D’Avigdor, trans. (New York: Dover, 1988, pp.
144-5.) At the same time, he envisioned
“the future Jewish commonwealth as based on socialistic, cooperative
lines.” Shlomo Avineri, The Making of
Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins
of the Jewish State (New York: Basic, 1981, p. 97.) And Herzl the liberal also anticipated the
dangers of permitting undue interference by the clerical establishment and the
military in the affairs of the Jewish state:
“We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the
same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their
barracks…[T]hey must not interfere in the administration of the State which
confers distinction upon them, else they will conjure up difficulties without
and within.” The Jewish State,
pp. 146-7.
[3]Theodor
Herzl, Old New Land, Lotta Levensohn, translator, Jacques Kornberg,
Introduction (Princeton: Marcus Weiner, 1960; 2000 reprint), p. 139.
[4]Jacques
Kornberg, Introduction, Old
New Land,
p. xxiv.
[5]Shlomo
Avineri elaborates on how Ahad Ha’am ultimately synthesized political Zionism
within his own spiritual and cultural Zionism.
Since most Jews will likely remain in the Diaspora even after the
creation of a Jewish state, noted Ahad Ha’am, Israel
must devote itself as well to addressing the spiritual and cultural problems
facing Diaspora Jewry. “A political
Zionism focusing exclusively on the establishment of a Jewish state, overlooks this
cultural dimension, which is vital for Jewish continued existence.” (Avineri, p. 117) See Ahad Ha’am, “The Jewish State and the
Jewish Problem,” in Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic, Hans Kohn, ed.
(New York, 1962), pp. 78-81. Observes
Arthur Hertzberg: “A case for Herzl’s
Zionism could be made on Ahad Ha’am’s own premises: if the Jewish people required new verve and
forms, Herzl’s demand to turn all Jewish energies into reestablishing a state
could evoke a renaissance of the tired Jewish spirit of the kind Ahad Ha’am was
calling for.” Arthur Hertzberg, “Ahad
Ha’am 100 Years Later,” The New York Review of Books, March 31, 1991, reprinted in
Hertzberg, Jewish Polemics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992),
p. 91.
[6]See
Ahad Ha’am, “The Jewish State and the Jewish Problem,” in Nationalism and
the Jewish Ethic, pp. 78-9.
[8]Walter
Laqueur, A History of Zionism (New York: Schocken, 1972), p. 240. See Ahad Ha’am, “After the Balfour
Declaration,” in Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic.
[10]Stephen
J. Zipperstein, Elusive Prophet Ahad
Ha'am and the Origins of Zionism (Berkeley: University of California,
1993), pp. 320-1.
[11]Pirkei
Avot: The Sayings of The Fathers,
Joseph H. Hertz, trans. (New York: Behrman House, 1945), I:14. (p. 25)
[12]Ahad
Ha'am, "The Character of Judaism," (1910), in Simon Noveck, ed., Contemporary
Jewish Thought: A Reader (New York: B'nai Brith Department of
Adult Jewish Education, 1963); originally published as "Between Two
Opinions," pp. 14-15.
[13]Ahad
Ha’am, pp. 14-15. Ahad Ha’am too only
imperfectly reflected progressive Zionism.
According to Zipperstein, “[D]espite his cautionary remarks about the
need for decent and just treatment of Arabs in Palestine—he bemoaned the that
the final draft of the Balfour Declaration left open the possibility of
conflicting national claims…Despite his mounting sense of the tragic
implications in the relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, he resorted
to a vague romanticism typical of his circle: the hope that peace will reign once Jewish
nationalism is secure in the hearts of Jews, and Arab enmity will be worn down
by a recognition of vague, apocryphal blood ties between the European Jewish
settlers and their new suspicious Arab neighbors.” Stephen J. Zipperstein, Elusive
Prophet Ahad Ha'am and the Origins of
Zionism, pp. 309, 247.
[14]Jerusalem
Post, March 10, 2000,
Editorial.
[15]Aharon
Barak, “Jewish or Democratic? Israel's
Top Judge Reflects on Values: What are
the values of the state of Israel
as a Jewish and democratic state?,” Forward, August 23, 2002. While it is true, as Barak suggests,
that Jabotinsky, the founder of right-wing Revisionist Zionism, was himself a
liberal, Laqueur notes that “In their transfer to Palestine, Jabotinsky’s views
lost much of their sophistication and moderation, and served as the ideological
justification for primitive and chauvinistic slogans which helped to poison
Arab-Jewish relations during the 1930’s and 1940’s.” (Laqueur, A History of Zionism, pp.
257, and p. 382 on Jabotinsky’s liberalism).
[16]Chicago Tribune, July 10, 2002
[17]Los
Angeles Times, July 9, 2002
[18]For
a statement of Israel’s Chief Justice Aharon Barak's views on the compatibility
of Israel as a particularistic Jewish state with a commitment to equal
treatment of all citizens, see "Justice Barak pledges to uphold 'Zionist'
equality; Supreme Court president says equal treatment of Jews and Arabs forms
very essence of Zionism," Ha'aretz,
May 23, 2000, and Jerusalem Post,
"Justice Barak: Reconcile the Jewish and the democratic State of
Israel," May 22, 2000, p. 3.
[19]Others
who hold this view include Yael Tamir, "A Jewish Democratic State,"
in Michael Walzer, Menachem Lorberbaum, Noam J.
Zohar, and Yair Lorberbaum, eds., The Jewish Political Tradition, Volume One:
Authority (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 518-523; A.
B. Yehoshua, in his debate with Anton Shammas in David Grossman’s Sleeping
on a Wire: Conversations with Palestinians in Israel (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 1993), pp. 250-277; Michael Walzer, On Toleration, p.
24, 42-3, and Walzer's "What Kind of State is a Jewish State?," Tikkun (July-August, 1989); Michael
Lerner, "Post-Zionism," in Jewish Renewal: A Path to Healing and Transformation (New
York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 262; and see Laurence J. Silberstein, The
Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture (New York:
Routledge, 1999 (pp. 139-145). Silberstein (p. 123) points out that
post-Zionists "share a common vision of Israel
as a pluralistic democratic state of all of its citizens…Yet there is no
consensus among postzionists as to how to realize such a goal. While some, like Pappe and Ram, advocate a
repeal of the Law of Return, others, while advocating full and equal rights for
the Palestinian minority, continue to the support the law." Without endorsing it himself, even Adi Ophir
recognizes the compatibility of a liberal Zionism with the post-Zionist
conception of Israel
as a state of all its citizens, the suggestion I defend in this essay. "For the post-Zionist," he notes,
"nationality should not determine citizenship but vice versa: citizenship
should determine the boundaries of the Israeli nation…Some liberal
Zionists…accept the inversion of the relation between nationhood and citizenship.
Many Zionists share with Ram the idea of
a strong Israeli civil society that would oppose Jewish [ultra-]nationalism and
racism." Adi Ophir, "The
Identity of the Victims and the Victims of Identity: A Critique of Zionist Ideology for a
Post-Zionist Age," in Laurence J. Silberstein, Mapping Jewish
Identities (New York: New
York University
Press, 2000), p. 186.
[20]Alan Dowty, “Zionism's Greatest Conceit,” Israel Studies
Volume 3, Number 1. For elaboration of
this point see Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later (Berkeley,
CA, 1998).
[21]Ruth
Gavison, “Can Israel
Be Both Jewish and Democratic?”, Moment, December 2000, pp. 71-2.
[22]New
York: Basic Books,
2000.
[23]“The
sense that denuding Israel of its Jewish character is the primary item on the
post-Zionist agenda was articulated by the distinguished historian of modern
Israel, Anita Shapira, in an interview with her in Yediot Aharonot's Literary Supplement [Dec. 23, 1994]." Bernard Susser and Charles S. Leibman, Choosing
Survival: Strategies for a Jewish Future
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 191, n. 17. Susser and Leibman characterize post-Zionism
as a program to "repudiate the Jewish character of Israel,"
an "all-out assault" on its Jewishness. (pp. 125, 127) They recognize however that not all "new
historians" embrace post-Zionism, so defined. (p. 192, n. 20) Indeed, they endorse something like the
middle road I advocate in this essay.
They note, defying the simple either/or dichotomizing of the
ulra-nationalist right (Yoram Hazony) and the neutralist, universalist radical
post-Zionist left, that "many otherwise ardent Zionists…favor specific
elements of the post-Zionist program such as forwarding the peace process,
protecting civil rights, fighting for equal rights for Arabs, and opposing
religious exploitation of political power." (p. 129) It is misleading however to describe the
peace process as a post-Zionist project:
its supporters were and are the Israeli mainstream, the Zionist public
of Israel. Susser and Leibman perspicuously draw attention to the common
assumption of the Orthodox right and the secular left post-Zionists that
"Jewishness as a nationality and Judaism as a religion form a unity."
(p. 131) For both, "religion is the sole basis of Jewish nationality"
and the radical post-Zionists "are only too happy to grant custodianship
over Jewishness to the religious.
Echoing the religious position, they contend that there is no secular
Jewish alternative [for defining Israel's
public space as a Jewish state] to religiously based Jewishness." Hence the resulting manufactured
dilemma: "As such, the choices that
face Israel are
two and only two: Either a Jewish state in the fully religious sense, or a
non-national, nonconfessional state of all its citizens. Clearly the prospect for secular Jewish
survival in Israel
depends on the fraudulence of this draconic choice." (p. 131-2)
[24]For
documentation of the wide inequalities between Jews and Arabs in Israel,
see David Grossman, Sleeping on A Wire.
For a more recent journalistic account in a mainstream Jewish
publication, see Michael S. Arnold, "Are Israel's Arabs Becoming
Radicalized?," Moment, April 2000, pp. 53-57, 80-88. Arnold
reports that "Israel's
Arabs have not achieved equality, in part because Israel
has skewed budgets over the years in favor of Jews. The results are visible in many sectors: Far
fewer Arabs than Jews finish high school (14 percent, compared to 36 percent),
and only 19 percent of eligible Arabs pass the matriculation exams necessary to
attend college--just half the national average.
Less than 5 percent of the Arab population finish college, compared to
more than 15 percent of Jews. And 80
percent of high school dropouts are Arab, according to the Adallah legal center
for Israeli Arab rights." While
"greater equalization of [government] budgets has made a huge dent in Arab
poverty, …more than 28 percent of Arab families still lived below the poverty
line in 1995." Only a few years
earlier, "about 50 percent of the Arab population, compared to that of 8%
of the Jewish population, [was] below the poverty line." See Nadim M. Rouhana, Palestinian Citizens
in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in
Conflict (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997), p. 92, which provides further data on Arab-Jewish inequality in Israel. David Arnow of The New Israel Fund reports (April 7, 2000) that "Infant
mortality is twice as high in the Arab sector; Arabs are twice as likely to
live below the poverty line; and while Arabs constitute 22% of the university
age population they represent under 6% of those attending university." (http://www.nif.org/news/justice.html)
[25]David
Grossman, Sleeping on a Wire, p. 260.
[26]The
Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority, with 112 Articles, was passed by the
Palestinian Legislative Council on October
2, 1997, and ratified by President Yasser Arafat on May 29, 2002. For the full text. see http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/palestbasic.htm. A newly revised draft constitution for the
future state of Palestine is ready
to be presented to PA President Arafat, according to the Jerusalem Post, “Final
draft of PA constitution nearly complete,” Sep. 19, 2002. An earlier draft is available at http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2001/conste1.html.
Regarding the right of return, the new draft constitution "guarantees the
natural right of all refugees to return to their homeland," according to
the Jerusalem Post. Unlike the
previous draft, which was drawn up before the Taba talks on the refugee issue,
the current version does not guarantee "The right of the Palestinian
refugee to return to his home and the original home of his ancestors." Since the new draft constitution uses the
more ambiguous term "homeland," it does not preclude Sari Nusseibeh’s
position that the PA should sign a peace treaty with Israel
under which refugees would have the right to return to their homeland by
becoming resident citizens of the new state of Palestine,
but not to areas inside Israel.
[27]“Katsav
advocates army service for all,” Ha'aretz, January 4, 2001:
“President Moshe Katsav said yesterday he supports compulsory national
service - though not necessarily the draft - for everyone, including Haredim
and Arabs. ‘I am definitely in favor of
universal national service,’ he said, speaking to reporters at the President's
Residence in Jerusalem. ‘I think it
is proper to go in the direction of national service, with the goal being to
help, in both the Jewish and Arab sectors, in the areas that oppress Israeli
society - poverty, social welfare, education and health.’”
[28]See
Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities
(New York: Columbia
University Press, 2001), pp. 1-23,
and Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1991. For specific application to
the Palestinian-Israeli problem, see Shibley Telhami, “The Road to Palestinian
Sovereignty: Problematic Structures or Conventional Obstacles?,” in Krasner,
ed. Problematic Sovereignty.
[29]Even today, under conditions of war in which previous
levels of support for a two-state solution have been eroded by bloodshed and
despair, the latest public opinion surveys show that 44% of Palestinians say
they still support a 2-state solution, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza living in peace next to Israel.
Only 28.9% support a bi-national state—a single state in all of historic
Palestine, encompassing what is now Israel, the West Bank and
Gaza. (Jerusalem Media & Communication Center Poll
Number 46, “On Palestinian Attitudes Towards
the Palestinian Situation and the Second anniversary of the Intifada,” September 21 -
25, 2002), at http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2002/no46.htm. According to another respected Palestinian
opinion research institute, Dr. Khalil Shikaki’s Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), another recent
poll shows that 73% of Palestinians “support reconciliation between the Israeli
and Palestinian peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment
of a Palestinian state.” Public Opinion Poll
# 5 (18-21 August 2002), at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p5a.html Shikaki notes that “this commitment to
reconciliation, based on a two-state solution, does not mean that all three
quarters believe it will actually happen. Indeed, 43% of all Palestinians
believe that reconciliation will never happen.”
And “while support, as in all previous polls, is very high for open
borders between the two states (84%) and for joint economic institutions and
ventures (68%)…only a minority of 22% supports the formation of joint political
institutions (aiming at the establishment of a confederation between the two
states).” People often fail to note
longitudinal trends in such poll results, which show for example that Palestinian
support for violence against Israel plummeted to 20% when the Oslo Accords were signed in
1993, and hopes were high for a negotiated solution, with backing for political
talks with Israel peaking at 80%.
(For a detailed analysis of the past decade of Palestinian public
opinion trends, which explains the relationship between changes in
Palestinian attitudes to the vicissitudes of political conditions, see
Khalil Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided,” Foreign Affairs, January/February,
2002.) Pollsters do not view many of the
other unfavorable findings in current opinion surveys as reflecting settled
attitudes, given the more positive results found in previous polls over not
only the previous year, but the past decade.
Support for a peace agreement and two-state solution is much less now
than before the intifada, and support for violence is of course much
greater. When peace talks are resumed,
and a basis for hope is restored, notes Major-General (res.) Shlomo Gazit,
former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, Palestinian attitudes will
moderate once again, as they have in the past.
(Associated Press, 6/12/02) In
his Foreign Affairs essay, Shikaki notes that “Between 1993 and 2001,
with the sole exception of 1994, Palestinian support for the Oslo agreement never dropped below 60 percent. But
Palestinian hopes began to fade away as a result of both Binyamin Netanyahu's
election as Israel's prime minister in mid-1996 and the continued
building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Palestinian expectations that the peace process would soon lead to
statehood and a permanent settlement dropped from 44 percent during Shimon
Peres' prime ministership in 1995-96 to 30 percent in the first year under
Netanyahu. Four years later, with Ehud Barak having replaced Netanyahu and
Jewish settlements continuing to expand, expectation of a permanent settlement
sank to 24 percent. Once Ariel Sharon won election as Israel's head of government in early 2001, a mere 11 percent
of Palestinians clung to that hope. The
loss of confidence in the ability of the peace process to deliver a permanent
agreement on acceptable terms had a dramatic impact on the level of Palestinian
support for violence against Israelis, including suicide bombings against
civilians. In July 2000, after U.S.
President Bill Clinton's failed attempt to broker a final peace settlement at Camp David but before the eruption of the second intifada, already 52 percent of Palestinians
approved of the use of violence; a year later, that figure reached the
unprecedented level of 86 percent.”
[30]Shimon
Peres, The New Middle East (New York:
Henry Holt, 1993), pp. 61-2.
[31]Itamar
Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel
and the Arabs at the End of the Century (New York: Farrar, 1999), pp. 189,
197.
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