

***What is Zionism?
A Peace Now Vision***

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“You shall be called the city of righteousness, the faithful city.
Zion shall be redeemed with justice.” Isaiah I: 26-27

What is Zionism? Zionism is the belief that Israel has a right to exist as a democratic Jewish state—nothing more, nothing less. It is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people. Zionism, like any form of nationalism, has found expression on the left, right and center of the political spectrum. All Zionists share the common denominator of commitment to the existence and flourishing of a Jewish state called Israel.

Progressive Zionism is best expressed by three whose life and work reflect the balance of universal and particular, the love of Israel and the Jewish people, and the love of peace and justice, common to the Biblical prophets, representing authentic Jewish values: Theodor Herzl, Ahad Ha'am, and Israel's Chief Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak. Each embodies dimensions of our Zionism.²

The Zionism of Peace Now draws on the progressive, humane outlook of Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism. It was Herzl who urged in *Old-New Land* (1902), “Hold fast to the things that have made us great: to liberality, tolerance, love of mankind. Only then is Zion truly Zion.”³ Herzl foresaw a Jewish state in which Jews and Arabs enjoyed full equality as citizens. The Zionism of Peace Now entails both a love for the Jewish people, a passion for its well-being, and a commitment to justice, equality, liberal democracy and human rights—cosmopolitan values. “For Herzl the fortunes of Zionism and those of European liberalism were intertwined. *Old-New Land* was a ... blue-print for a liberal New Society in Palestine.”⁴ We fight for Arab-Israeli peace and a more equalitarian society in Israel out of a recognition that a just and well-crafted political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the larger Arab-Israeli dispute, will enhance Israel's security, fortifying it economically, politically and socially. And we struggle to realize these ideals because they are at the core of our moral vision as Zionists. In our Zionism there is no contradiction between our belief in the justice of a state which embodies Jewish culture and symbols in its public life, reflecting the heritage and needs of the Jewish people, and our embrace of universal moral values.

Ahad Ha'am (which means “one of the people”), the pen name of Asher Ginsburg, founded what is known as Cultural Zionism, the idea that Jews should come together in the historic Land of Israel so that they can cooperatively build what will become the common cultural center of the Jewish people throughout the world, forming a collective space that is Jewish. Herzl and Ahad Ha'am represented two

contrasting approaches to Zionism in their day, the one focusing on state-building, the other on creating a Jewish cultural and spiritual center in the Land of Israel for all Jews everywhere, reviving Hebrew and the moral core of Judaism. But their ideas can be united, particularly now that political Zionism has achieved its primary goal of establishing a Jewish state.⁵ Ahad Ha'am sought to establish not only "a state of the Jews," which he saw as Herzl's goal, but a "Jewish state" animated by Jewish spiritual and moral values.⁶

For Ahad Ha'am, Jewish national aspirations can only be realized "while maintaining respect for the feelings and rights of the region's Arabs."⁷ Jews, cautioned Ahad Ha'am, "should not forget that for the Arabs too, Palestine was a national home."⁸ Indeed, in a famous essay titled "Truth from the Land of Israel," written from Jerusalem in 1891, "he was the first Zionist...to raise the question of the Arabs" of Palestine.⁹ He made the "call for a decent treatment of Palestine's Arabs" essential not only to the resurrection of Zion and the Zionist enterprise, but to the future of Judaism itself, which was to become "the civic religion of a future Israel."¹⁰ Ahad Ha'am stresses that following the universal principle of love and respect for the other does not commit the Jew to self-abnegation—or what might be called today, self-hatred or self-denial. On the contrary, because it commands the Jew to love himself, and to love others no less, it obligates him to fulfill his individual and national identity to the fullest extent that is consistent with the demands of justice. The same idea is expressed in Rabbi Hillel's maxim, from Pirke Avot, "If I am not for myself, what am I for; but if I am *only for myself*, what am I?"¹¹ Ahad Ha'am also maintained that the most fundamental principle of Jewish ethics—"You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18)—does not teach us to love our neighbor *more* than ourselves, but as much: "The true meaning of the verse is: 'Self-love must not be allowed to incline the scale on the side of your own advantage; love your neighbor as yourself, and then justice will necessarily decide, and you will do nothing to your neighbor that you would consider a wrong if it were done to yourself'... Judaism cannot accept the altruistic principle; it cannot put 'other' in the centre of the circle, because that place belongs to justice, which knows no distinction between 'self' and 'other.'"¹² Some critics allege that the Love Thy Neighbor Principle in the Torah strictly refers only to one's own countrymen, so that a Jew's neighbors in a Jewish state would be his fellow Jews. The text itself gives the lie to this thesis, a scant fifteen verses later: (Lev. 9: 30 - 34): "When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not wrong him. The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; *you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.*"

It was Ahad Ha'am who spoke of the relationship between Jewish nationalism and Jewish ethics, both of which comprise our Zionism, in an essay called "The Character of Judaism":

The Jewish law of justice is not confined within the narrow sphere of individual relations. In its Jewish sense the precept 'Thou shalt love

thy neighbor as thyself' can be carried out by a whole nation in its dealings with other nations. For this precept does not oblige a nation to sacrifice its life or its position for the benefit of other nations. It is, on the contrary, the duty of every nation, as of every individual human being, to live and to develop to the utmost limit of its powers; but at the same time it must recognize the right of other nations to fulfill the like duty without let or hindrance. Patriotism—that is, national egoism—must not induce it to disregard justice, and to seek self-fulfillment through the destruction of other nations.¹³

There are different forms of Zionism. One form stresses Jewish national self-aggrandizement at the expense of the Jewish commitment to equality, justice and liberal values. The other Zionism balances our duties to our selves and our own nation with our universal commitments, in the belief that one can love and give preference in special ways to one's own people while also promoting equality, justice and respect for all, Jew and non-Jew alike, in Israel. One such preference is Israel's Jewish public culture, expressing the historical memory and national identity of its Jewish majority; another is the Law of Return which allows any Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen. Our pursuit of peace and justice arises not only from our embrace of Biblically-inspired moral imperatives, but from our own self-interest as a Jewish nation and people: our well-being and security requires that we strive to live with our Arab neighbors in peace and justice, helping Israel and our fellow Jews there to work towards just and peaceful relations with them.

While Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, our liberation is impossible without the concomitant flourishing of Palestinian political and cultural life in a state living at peace next to Israel, whose people should be treated with full respect and equality when they are citizens of Israel.

Israel as a Democratic Jewish State: Chief Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak

Israel's Declaration of Independence, "anticipated and boldly confronted the possible tension between the Law of Return and the principle of equality," between Israel's pursuit of the Jewish national project and its commitment to equal citizenship for Jews and Arabs alike, embracing both in the same paragraph: "The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations." "In other words, the nation's founders saw no inherent contradiction between the exigencies of creating a Jewish state, the values of the prophets, and international principles of human rights."¹⁴

Chief Justice Aharon Barak explains that Israel's "declaration of independence called to 'the children of the Arab nation living in the Land of Israel to keep the peace and take part in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship.' Zionism was not based on discrimination against non-Jews, but on their integration into the Jewish national home. Zionism was born as a response against discrimination and racism. Certainly the values of the State of Israel as a democratic state stand opposed to discrimination and demand equality. Indeed, the democratic state is obliged to honor the basic rights of every individual in the state to equality, and to protect them. But equality is a complex right. Treating individuals in a different manner does not always imply treating them in a discriminatory manner, and nor does treating individuals in an identical manner automatically imply treating them in an equal manner."

"The claim is heard," notes Barak, "that this application of the principle of equality between Jews and Arabs spells the end of Zionism, or that it embodies a post-Zionist attitude. Nothing could be further from the truth. Zionism is not based on discrimination between Jews and Arabs. That is not how the declaration of independence saw it when it called on 'the children of the Arab nation who live in the State of Israel to keep the peace and assume their share in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship'; that is not how the founding fathers, Theodor Herzl, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, David Ben-Gurion and others, saw it when they repeatedly emphasized that the Jewish state was a state in which full equality between Jews and Arabs would prevail; that is not how the Supreme Court saw it from its earliest days, when it repeatedly emphasized equality between citizens of the state on the basis of religion, race and gender. Of course, the principle of equality itself, by its essence, permits — in cases where circumstances require it — differing but non-discriminatory treatment among equals, such that it is permissible to infringe on equality under certain defined conditions."¹⁵

"The values of Judaism and democracy have broad jurisprudential importance in Israel," continues Barak. "They have constitutional status, influencing both the determination of the extent of human rights and the protection accorded them in Israeli jurisprudence. The phrase 'the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state' entered into Israeli law in 1992 with the enactment of two Basic Laws governing, respectively, freedom of occupation and human dignity and freedom. The Basic Laws, 11 in total, serve as the *de facto* constitution of Israel. Israel's Jewish and democratic values are accorded supralegal-constitutional status and serve as a legal yardstick by which to measure the applicability of the Basic Laws."

"Only a national home built on foundations of equality and respect for the individual can endure over time," concludes Israel's Chief Justice. "Only a state that relates in an equal manner to all its children can win acceptance in the society of freedom-loving nations. Only a society based on principles of equality can live in peace with itself."

“There is no contradiction between striving to grant the Arabs equality as required by law and decency and the fulfillment of Zionism,” said Israel’s Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein, who happens also to be an Orthodox Jew. “Whoever wants to preserve Israel as a democratic and Jewish state must strive to grant equality to the Arabs.”¹⁶ “Israel is the state of the Jewish people,” notes Israeli Cabinet Minister Dan Meridor, “but because it is a Jewish state, it must not practice against its non-Jewish citizens the kind of discrimination to which Jews were subjected in the diaspora.”¹⁷ Our Israel is both a Jewish and a liberal democratic state, and liberal democracy requires equality among all citizens, Jewish or Palestinian, in the domestic public sphere where the government acts, when it provides education, allocates budget and land, regulates employment, assesses taxes, and imposes the duty on citizens to serve the state through national service.

In our Zionism, realizing equality for all Israel’s citizens by no means compromises Israel’s unique character as a Jewish nation-state. Israel can remain the guardian of the interests of the Jewish people and be a well-spring of its cultural and religious renewal, as Israel’s Chief Justice Aharon Barak continues to urge:¹⁸

In a speech entitled 'The State of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State,' Barak outlined the characteristics that make Israel a Jewish state. 'It is a state to which every Jew has a right to immigrate and in which the ingathering of exiles is a basic value,' said Barak. '...a state whose history is intermixed and enmeshed with the history of the Jewish people, whose language is Hebrew, and whose holidays reflect the Jewish heritage. A Jewish state is a state where Jewish settlement in the countryside, cities and rural settlements is the prime concern...a state which preserves the memory of the Jews who were slaughtered in the Holocaust...A Jewish state is a state which encourages Jewish culture and education and love for the Jewish people. A Jewish state is the realization of the hope of generations for the redemption of Israel. A Jewish state is a state whose values are the freedom, justice, honesty and peace which are part of the Jewish heritage. A Jewish state is a state whose values include those which emanate from the religious tradition. The Bible is the most fundamental of its books, and the prophets are the foundation of its morality...a state in which Jewish law has an important function...where the values of the Bible, the values of Jewish heritage and the values of the Halacha make up part of the fundamental values.'

Aharon Barak’s is our Zionism. In our Zionism, there is no contradiction between Israel as a democratic Jewish state and Israel as a state of its citizens.¹⁹ Speaking of the Law of Return, Israel’s ties with the Jewish Diaspora, and the maintenance of a Jewish majority, Alan Dowty notes that “None of these features is inherently inconsistent with liberal democracy, and none of them are in fact

unique to Israel. There are at least two dozen ethnic democracies in the world (among several dozen ethnic states), and a large number of states grant citizenship on the basis of ethnic identity or descent.”²⁰ Observes Israeli constitutional law scholar Ruth Gavison: “The Jewishness of Israel is, first and foremost, the recognition of the fact that Israel is the state in which the Jewish people exercises its right to national self-determination. Many of the world’s democracies, old and new, have a distinct culture analogous to Israel’s Jewish culture. The constitutions of most European countries reveal that they are nation-states in this sense. These states celebrate their distinct histories, languages, identities, and emblems. Many of their citizens do not share this nationality. But so long as the rights of these citizens are not denied, and so long as they can participate fully in the political and civil life of their societies, we do not deny the democratic nature of the state.”²¹

It escapes right-wing Zionists like Yoram Hazony in his flawed volume *The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul*,²² that post-Zionism is a field of many colors, a hybrid of historical revision, cultural criticism and normative political recommendations. One may harvest from among its fruits while leaving some of its lands fallow; one may cleave to its goal of inclusion and democratization, while dissenting not only over the means to this end but over its very meaning. There is no clash between Israel's remaining a haven for persecuted Jews, or inviting free Jewish immigration under the Law of Return, and its becoming fully a state of all its citizens. Critics on the ultra-nationalist right, like their radical post-Zionist antipodes—purists who rail against the very fact of Jewish power rather than its unjust application—would impale Israel on one or the other horn of a false dilemma.²³

Hazony seems tone deaf to the need for fulfilling the promise of equal citizenship for the Arabs of Israel, as codified in its Declaration of Independence. If he is genuinely troubled by the Palestinization of Israel's Arab community, and the prospect that Palestinian national identity will translate into a secessionist movement, why does Hazony consistently fail to champion large-scale efforts to remove the stain of social and material privation from its Arab population? Does he seriously expect a minority long discriminated against by the state in housing, education, job opportunity, urban development, economic support, and basic social services will display undying fealty?²⁴ He who seeks the abiding loyalty of this community should praise the first steps at fuller inclusion which Israel has taken, including the elevation of an Arab judge to Israel's Supreme Court, the participation of Arab Knesset Members in the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, rising government budget allocations for Arab municipalities under Labor during some of the Oslo years, Supreme Court rulings affirming equality for Arabs in the allocation of land, and encourage other far more dramatic steps. Because Hazony has failed to face this ineluctable problem, he cannot accomplish the task he has set himself: refurbishing the idea of the Jewish state. "There is no way of resolving the ongoing debate on the relationship between 'Jewish' and 'Israeli' without first resolving the question of the relation between

the Israeli Jew and the Israeli Arab, the question of 'who is an Israeli,'" as David Grossman sagely notes in *Sleeping on a Wire: Conversations with Palestinians in Israel*²⁵, a chronicle which remains required reading for anyone hoping to rededicate the Jewish state with lasting oil, without relying on miracles. By dismissing the Oslo peace process as the child of post-Zionist flight from the image of a Jewish nation-state—as if most of its supporters were not in fact Zionists—Hazon displays a tin ear for equal citizenship, equal respect for all, as the true source of the struggle for Israeli-Palestinian peace. If West Bank and Gaza Palestinians cannot enjoy such equal status as Israeli citizens, a result neither side wishes, they must be afforded the chance to secure it in their own polity in the territory where they reside.

Jews form the majority in Israel's national society, and so they represent the prevailing culture, just as in the peaceful Palestinian state which as Zionists we are committed to help realize, Palestinian Arabs will form the majority, and a Palestinian culture, infused by the Islamic values of the largely Muslim population, will reflect the dominant culture of Muslim Palestinians in that area. The draft constitution of the future state of Palestine defines it as a Muslim Arab state, while guaranteeing relative freedom of religion, and equal civil and political rights to all Palestinian citizens.²⁶ And just as Israel gives preference to Jews wishing to emigrate to it, under the Law of Return, so the state of Palestine will have a Palestinian Law of Return, which gives preference to Palestinians, especially Palestinian refugees, to emigrate into the new state. Both states, Israel and Palestine, will ultimately contain minorities, and in both the minorities must be treated with full equality before the law. The education systems and public cultures of both societies should promote equal respect in the public and private interaction of all people with one another.

Our Zionism strives to forge a common civic post-national culture which both Jews and Palestinian Arabs can share equally in the Jewish state of Israel, and in relations between Israel and the state of Palestine. With Herzl, Ahad Ha'am and Aharon Barak, it understands the moral limits of the national thread in Zionism, recognizing the imperative of a cooperative, common identity to complement—not replace—the national identity inherent in Zionism. And because, on our Zionism, both states should seek to develop such a common civic egalitarian public culture to complement the particularistic aspects of their national cultures, they will draw from their own cultures in the articulation of that common public culture to be shared by Jews and Arabs in Palestine-Israel. Our Zionism sees not only two states, living in peace side by side, it sees the Palestinian citizens of Israel enjoying full equality legally, economically and socially in a Jewish republic, as it does Jews, Christians and other minorities eventually living in full equality with Muslim Palestinians in a Palestinian Arab republic in the West Bank and Gaza.

In the Jewish republic, Israel, Palestinian citizens should have equal civic responsibilities and enjoy equal civic benefits. Equal civic duties means national

service for all citizens, including eventually, when conditions permit, service for all Israeli citizens in the Israel Defense Forces, which will, with the full realization of our Zionism, no longer face a neighboring Arab army with which it is likely to be at war. Israel's current president, formerly a Likud Member of Knesset, and previous Labor prime ministers have proposed instituting national service for all citizens of Israel, Jewish and Arab.²⁷ Our Zionism works assiduously to attenuate armed national conflict and to establish a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Our struggle for peace will also help remove the main obstacle to equal civic duties and benefits for Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians, the ongoing national conflict. Indeed, we can work to reduce these obstacles to fuller equality between Jews and Arabs in Israeli society even now as part of our larger mission to seek peace and justice.

From the Two-State Solution to A Third Way

With these changes, a regional security force protecting Palestine-Israel as a whole might one day become possible in the distant future, akin to a NATO to which individual nation states in the region each contribute forces. Israel's contribution to this regional force would include both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. This may be a goal far off in the future, but it is a goal towards which our Zionism obliges us to work.

For a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to succeed, both Israelis and Palestinians must begin to overcome the zero-sum game thinking inherent in nineteenth-century mythologies of nationalism and the absolutely sovereign nation-state. Many contemporary nation-states no longer see sovereignty in such terms, recognizing that the world has become more interdependent, and that independence coexists with globalism in markets, media, culture and human rights norms in political and legal practice. Sovereignty represents a set of attributes which not only can be, but are, unbundled in many countries.²⁸ In a zero-sum game, players view all facets of sovereignty as non-negotiable, so that variations in the degree of a given state power are treated as fundamental infringements by the other party on the right to national self-determination in an independent state. An analogous fallacy is reflected in the view that government regulation of markets violates economic liberty, when in fact the free market could not function well, or at all, if the government did not prevent monopolies or remedy excess inequities which, left unchecked, would undermine the market system itself. By the same token, a necessary trade-off between elements of sovereignty is regarded as an affront to self-government, rather than a realistic accommodation reflecting the way sovereign powers are often unavoidably distributed elsewhere. A classical two-state solution involves creating two fully sovereign countries in an arid patch lacking in natural resources that is little more than fifty miles wide, the breadth of Chicago and its suburbs. If the twenty-first century is to avoid reprising the tragedies of the past, now with catastrophic weapons of mass destruction in the hands of fundamentalists, we must start thinking more and more in post-national terms, even while maintaining our

national commitments, as Zionists and Palestinian nationalists. Israel/Palestine is a corner of the globe where such new models may be needed most, if only for the very survival of the two nation-states. The kind of future Palestinians and Israelis should begin to construct is neither a single "bi-national" state, nor a conventional two-state arrangement, but an alternative in between, a third way, evolving over time, and by mutual consent. It must begin as two nation-states, which is the unmistakable will of both peoples²⁹, and evolve towards nation-states in a regional confederation. Both peoples would maintain continued allegiance to their own nation-states, largely self-governing, but start to move toward devolving some elements of national sovereignty into a cooperative supra-national regional political structure, with some similarities to the European Union. Water, environmental safety, and security are ultimately regional problems which Palestinians and Israelis are going to have to address together; there will be many more challenges where regional cooperation will prove inescapable.

While such notions may seem reminiscent of Shimon Peres' controversial "new Middle East," they differ in several important respects. Peres sought to base Israeli-Arab peace agreements on a regional security system and economic integration encompassing most or all Arab states; he described the "ultimate goal" as being "the creation of a regional community of nations, with a common market and elected centralized bodies, modeled on the European Community."³⁰ This is far too ambitious. Moreover, the notion of a regional community for the entire Middle East, or just for Israel and a number of Arab states, even if pursued gradually as Peres suggested, was unwelcome to both Egypt and Syria. Syrian President Hafez Assad believed "that his regime can cope with the effects of peace and limited normalization with Israel," but not with economic and political integration with Israel.³¹ Indeed, "Assad's difficulties with this very approach were an important element in the subsequent failure to achieve a breakthrough."³² Even Peres, to his credit, recognized that "the road is long and difficult, and even in the West people sometimes takes two steps backward for every step forward. In the Middle East, as in Eastern Europe, the process is far more complex; people are not yet ready to accept a [transnational]...identity."³³ Peres envisioned a "Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli 'Benelux' for economic affairs."³⁴ But Palestinian-Israeli economic cooperation may be inadvisable for the foreseeable future for reasons similar to those which led Egypt and Syria to demur, particularly given the wide disparities between the Palestinian and Israeli economies. Still, some forms of cooperation between Palestine and Israel will prove impossible to avoid, and acceptable to both parties in the first phase after a peace treaty. Palestinians and Israelis will have to crawl before they can walk; but they will be unable to address problems of water and environment, for example, unless they crawl, and walk, together. The cooperative arrangements which emerge should serve as a model for future joint institutions.

A classical two-state framework may serve only to feed revanchist nationalist sentiments, leading to renewed ethno-national conflict rather than to a stable

peace. We must foster a countervailing force, one which stresses the values of regional cooperation and civic equality. Attachments to the sacred space and time of history and place, rootedness in ancestral family homes and tribal symbolism—whether by refugees insisting they can only return to their long-lost villages in Israel, or by settlers who demand to live everywhere their collective national memory was forged and to extend Israeli sovereign rule to every such area—must be tempered and transformed by new commitments to a shared political identity nourished by the ideal of equal citizenship. Rather than an intifada for winning Palestinian sovereignty over a holy mosque called Al-Aksa, placing both politics and law in the service of religion, we need a joint Israeli-Palestinian struggle for casting off the shibboleths and illusions of absolute national sovereignty itself. This is the hidden secret of human rights and international justice struggling to break free amidst the pious inflammatory nationalisms roiling the waters and sands of Palestine, Israel and the Middle East today.

To learn more about Zionism see [Recommended Reading: Books](#), on the Chicago Peace Now website.

¹Gidon D. Remba is President of Chicago Peace Now, an affiliate of Americans for Peace Now, which supports Israel's largest peace group, Shalom Achshav. This essay is excerpted from a more comprehensive study of Zionism and post-Zionism by the author, titled “We Are All Post-Zionists Now: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State.”

²Each express progressive Zionism in different degrees and imperfectly. In both *The Jewish State* (1896) and *Old-New Land*, Herzl betrays a preference for a “democratic monarchy and an aristocratic republic” as his ideal form of government, and is unable to imagine the revival of the Hebrew language in a Jewish state in the Land of Israel. In these and other respects, Herzl leaves much to be desired both in his commitment to liberalism, and to Jewish nationalism. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State*, Silvie D’Avigdor, trans. (New York: Dover, 1988, pp. 144-5.) At the same time, he envisioned “the future Jewish commonwealth as based on socialistic, cooperative lines.” Shlomo Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State* (New York: Basic, 1981, p. 97.) And Herzl the liberal also anticipated the dangers of permitting undue interference by the clerical establishment and the military in the affairs of the Jewish state: “We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their barracks...[T]hey must not interfere in the administration of the State which confers distinction upon them, else they will conjure up difficulties without and within.” *The Jewish State*, pp. 146-7.

³Theodor Herzl, *Old New Land*, Lotta Levensohn, translator, Jacques Kornberg, Introduction (Princeton: Marcus Weiner, 1960; 2000 reprint), p. 139.

⁴Jacques Kornberg, Introduction, *Old New Land*, p. xxiv.

⁵Shlomo Avineri elaborates on how Ahad Ha’am ultimately synthesized political Zionism within his own spiritual and cultural Zionism. Since most Jews will likely remain in the Diaspora even after the creation of a Jewish state, noted Ahad Ha’am, Israel must devote itself as well to addressing the spiritual and cultural problems facing Diaspora Jewry. “A political Zionism focusing exclusively on the establishment of a Jewish state, overlooks this cultural dimension, which is vital for Jewish continued existence.” (Avineri, p. 117) See Ahad Ha’am, “The Jewish State and the Jewish Problem,” in *Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic*, Hans Kohn, ed. (New York, 1962), pp. 78-81. Observes Arthur Hertzberg: “A case for Herzl’s Zionism

could be made on Ahad Ha'am's own premises: if the Jewish people required new verve and forms, Herzl's demand to turn all Jewish energies into reestablishing a state could evoke a renaissance of the tired Jewish spirit of the kind Ahad Ha'am was calling for." Arthur Hertzberg, "Ahad Ha'am 100 Years Later," *The New York Review of Books*, March 31, 1991, reprinted in Hertzberg, Jewish Polemics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 91.

⁶See Ahad Ha'am, "The Jewish State and the Jewish Problem," in Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic, pp. 78-9.

⁷Hertzberg, p. 96.

⁸Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (New York: Schocken, 1972), p. 240. See Ahad Ha'am, "After the Balfour Declaration," in Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic.

⁹Hertzberg, p. 94.

¹⁰Stephen J. Zipperstein, Elusive Prophet Ahad Ha'am and the Origins of Zionism (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), pp. 320-1.

¹¹Pirkei Avot: The Sayings of The Fathers, Joseph H. Hertz, trans. (New York: Behrman House, 1945), I:14. (p. 25)

¹²Ahad Ha'am, "The Character of Judaism," (1910), in Simon Noveck, ed., Contemporary Jewish Thought: A Reader (New York: B'nai Brith Department of Adult Jewish Education, 1963); originally published as "Between Two Opinions," pp. 14-15.

¹³Ahad Ha'am, pp. 14-15. Ahad Ha'am too only imperfectly reflected progressive Zionism. According to Zipperstein, "[D]espite his cautionary remarks about the need for decent and just treatment of Arabs in Palestine—he bemoaned the that the final draft of the Balfour Declaration left open the possibility of conflicting national claims...Despite his mounting sense of the tragic implications in the relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, he resorted to a vague romanticism typical of his circle: the hope that peace will reign once Jewish nationalism is secure in the hearts of Jews, and Arab enmity will be worn down by a recognition of vague, apocryphal blood ties between the European Jewish settlers and their new suspicious Arab neighbors." Stephen J. Zipperstein, Elusive Prophet Ahad Ha'am and the Origins of Zionism, pp. 309, 247.

¹⁴*Jerusalem Post*, March 10, 2000, Editorial.

¹⁵Aharon Barak, "Jewish or Democratic? Israel's Top Judge Reflects on Values: What are the values of the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state?," *Forward*, August 23, 2002. While it is true, as Barak suggests, that Jabotinsky, the founder of right-wing Revisionist Zionism, was himself a liberal, Laqueur notes that "In their transfer to Palestine, Jabotinsky's views lost much of their sophistication and moderation, and served as the ideological justification for primitive and chauvinistic slogans which helped to poison Arab-Jewish relations during the 1930's and 1940's." (Laqueur, A History of Zionism, pp. 257, and p. 382 on Jabotinsky's liberalism).

¹⁶*Chicago Tribune*, July 10, 2002

¹⁷*Los Angeles Times*, July 9, 2002

¹⁸For a statement of Israel's Chief Justice Aharon Barak's views on the compatibility of Israel as a particularistic Jewish state with a commitment to equal treatment of all citizens, see "Justice Barak pledges to uphold 'Zionist' equality; Supreme Court president says equal treatment of Jews and Arabs forms very essence of Zionism," *Ha'aretz*, May 23, 2000, and *Jerusalem Post*, "Justice Barak: Reconcile the Jewish and the democratic State of Israel," May 22, 2000, p. 3.

¹⁹Others who hold this view include Yael Tamir, "A Jewish Democratic State," in Michael Walzer, Menachem Lorberbaum, Noam J. Zohar, and Yair Lorberbaum, eds., The Jewish Political Tradition, Volume One: Authority (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 518-523; A. B. Yehoshua, in his debate with Anton Shammas in David Grossman's Sleeping on a Wire: Conversations with Palestinians in Israel (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993), pp. 250-277; Michael Walzer, On Toleration, p. 24, 42-3, and Walzer's "What Kind of State is a Jewish State?," *Tikkun* (July-August, 1989); Michael Lerner, "Post-Zionism," in Jewish Renewal: A Path to Healing and Transformation (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 262; and see Laurence J. Silberstein, The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture (New York: Routledge, 1999 (pp. 139-145). Silberstein (p. 123) points out that post-Zionists "share a common vision of Israel as a pluralistic democratic state of all of its citizens...Yet there is no consensus among postzionists as to how to realize such a goal. While some, like Pappé and Ram, advocate a repeal of the Law of Return, others, while advocating full and equal rights for the Palestinian minority, continue to support the law." Without endorsing it himself, even Adi Ophir recognizes the

compatibility of a liberal Zionism with the post-Zionist conception of Israel as a state of all its citizens, the suggestion I defend in this essay. "For the post-Zionist," he notes, "nationality should not determine citizenship but vice versa: citizenship should determine the boundaries of the Israeli nation...Some liberal Zionists...accept the inversion of the relation between nationhood and citizenship. Many Zionists share with Ram the idea of a strong Israeli civil society that would oppose Jewish [ultra-]nationalism and racism." Adi Ophir, "The Identity of the Victims and the Victims of Identity: A Critique of Zionist Ideology for a Post-Zionist Age," in Laurence J. Silberstein, Mapping Jewish Identities (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p. 186.

²⁰Alan Dowty, "Zionism's Greatest Conceit," *Israel Studies* Volume 3, Number 1. For elaboration of this point see Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later (Berkeley, CA, 1998).

²¹Ruth Gavison, "Can Israel Be Both Jewish and Democratic?," *Moment*, December 2000, pp. 71-2.

²²New York: Basic Books, 2000.

²³"The sense that denuding Israel of its Jewish character is the primary item on the post-Zionist agenda was articulated by the distinguished historian of modern Israel, Anita Shapira, in an interview with her in *Yediot Aharonot's* Literary Supplement [Dec. 23, 1994]." Bernard Susser and Charles S. Leibman, Choosing Survival: Strategies for a Jewish Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 191, n. 17. Susser and Leibman characterize post-Zionism as a program to "repudiate the Jewish character of Israel," an "all-out assault" on its Jewishness. (pp. 125, 127) They recognize however that not all "new historians" embrace post-Zionism, so defined. (p. 192, n. 20) Indeed, they endorse something like the middle road I advocate in this essay. They note, defying the simple either/or dichotomizing of the ultra-nationalist right (Yoram Hazony) and the neutralist, universalist radical post-Zionist left, that "many otherwise ardent Zionists...favor specific elements of the post-Zionist program such as forwarding the peace process, protecting civil rights, fighting for equal rights for Arabs, and opposing religious exploitation of political power." (p. 129) It is misleading however to describe the peace process as a post-Zionist project: its supporters were and are the Israeli mainstream, the Zionist public of Israel. Susser and Leibman perspicuously draw attention to the common assumption of the Orthodox right and the secular left post-Zionists that "Jewishness as a nationality and Judaism as a religion form a unity." (p. 131) For both, "religion is the sole basis of Jewish nationality" and the radical post-Zionists "are only too happy to grant custodianship over Jewishness to the religious. Echoing the religious position, they contend that there is no secular Jewish alternative [for defining Israel's public space as a Jewish state] to religiously based Jewishness." Hence the resulting manufactured dilemma: "As such, the choices that face Israel are two and only two: Either a Jewish state in the fully religious sense, or a non-national, nonconfessional state of all its citizens. Clearly the prospect for secular Jewish survival in Israel depends on the fraudulence of this draconic choice." (p. 131-2)

²⁴For documentation of the wide inequalities between Jews and Arabs in Israel, see David Grossman, Sleeping on a Wire. For a more recent journalistic account in a mainstream Jewish publication, see Michael S. Arnold, "Are Israel's Arabs Becoming Radicalized?," *Moment*, April 2000, pp. 53-57, 80-88. Arnold reports that "Israel's Arabs have not achieved equality, in part because Israel has skewed budgets over the years in favor of Jews. The results are visible in many sectors: Far fewer Arabs than Jews finish high school (14 percent, compared to 36 percent), and only 19 percent of eligible Arabs pass the matriculation exams necessary to attend college--just half the national average. Less than 5 percent of the Arab population finish college, compared to more than 15 percent of Jews. And 80 percent of high school dropouts are Arab, according to the Adallah legal center for Israeli Arab rights." While "greater equalization of [government] budgets has made a huge dent in Arab poverty, ...more than 28 percent of Arab families still lived below the poverty line in 1995." Only a few years earlier, "about 50 percent of the Arab population, compared to that of 8% of the Jewish population, [was] below the poverty line." See Nadim M. Rouhana, Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 92, which provides further data on Arab-Jewish inequality in Israel. David Arnow of The New Israel Fund reports (April 7, 2000) that "Infant mortality is twice as high in the Arab sector; Arabs are twice as likely to live below the poverty line; and while Arabs constitute 22% of the university age population they represent under 6% of those attending university." (<http://www.nif.org/news/justice.html>)

²⁵David Grossman, Sleeping on a Wire, p. 260.

²⁶The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority, with 112 Articles, was passed by the Palestinian Legislative Council on October 2, 1997, and ratified by President Yasser Arafat on May 29, 2002. For the full text. see

<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/palestbasic.htm>. A newly revised draft constitution for the future state of Palestine is ready to be presented to PA President Arafat, according to the Jerusalem Post, "Final draft of PA constitution nearly complete," Sep. 19, 2002. An earlier draft is available at <http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2001/constel.html>. Regarding the right of return, the new draft constitution "guarantees the natural right of all refugees to return to their homeland," according to the *Jerusalem Post*. Unlike the previous draft, which was drawn up before the Taba talks on the refugee issue, the current version does not guarantee "The right of the Palestinian refugee to return to his home and the original home of his ancestors." Since the new draft constitution uses the more ambiguous term "homeland," it does not preclude Sari Nusseibeh's position that the PA should sign a peace treaty with Israel under which refugees would have the right to return to their homeland by becoming resident citizens of the new state of Palestine, but not to areas inside Israel.

²⁷"Katsav advocates army service for all," *Ha'aretz*, January 4, 2001: "President Moshe Katsav said yesterday he supports compulsory national service - though not necessarily the draft - for everyone, including Haredim and Arabs. 'I am definitely in favor of universal national service,' he said, speaking to reporters at the President's Residence in Jerusalem. 'I think it is proper to go in the direction of national service, with the goal being to help, in both the Jewish and Arab sectors, in the areas that oppress Israeli society - poverty, social welfare, education and health.'"

²⁸See Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 1-23, and Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). For specific application to the Palestinian-Israeli problem, see Shibley Telhami, "The Road to Palestinian Sovereignty: Problematic Structures or Conventional Obstacles?," in Krasner, ed. Problematic Sovereignty.

²⁹Even today, under conditions of war in which previous levels of support for a two-state solution have been eroded by bloodshed and despair, the latest public opinion surveys show that 44% of Palestinians say they still support a 2-state solution, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza living in peace next to Israel. Only 28.9% support a bi-national state—a single state in all of historic Palestine, encompassing what is now Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. (Jerusalem Media & Communication Center Poll Number 46, "On Palestinian Attitudes Towards the Palestinian Situation and the Second anniversary of the Intifada," September 21 - 25, 2002), at <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2002/no46.htm>. According to another respected Palestinian opinion research institute, Dr. Khalil Shikaki's Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), another recent poll shows that 73% of Palestinians "support reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state." Public Opinion Poll # 5 (18-21 August 2002), at <http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p5a.html> Shikaki notes that "this commitment to reconciliation, based on a two-state solution, does not mean that all three quarters believe it will actually happen. Indeed, 43% of all Palestinians believe that reconciliation will never happen." And "while support, as in all previous polls, is very high for open borders between the two states (84%) and for joint economic institutions and ventures (68%)...only a minority of 22% supports the formation of joint political institutions (aiming at the establishment of a confederation between the two states)." People often fail to note longitudinal trends in such poll results, which show for example that Palestinian support for violence against Israel plummeted to 20% when the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, and hopes were high for a negotiated solution, with backing for political talks with Israel peaking at 80%. (For a detailed analysis of the past decade of Palestinian public opinion trends, which explains the relationship between changes in Palestinian attitudes to the vicissitudes of political conditions, see Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 2002.) Pollsters do not view many of the other unfavorable findings in current opinion surveys as reflecting settled attitudes, given the more positive results found in previous polls over not only the previous year, but the past decade. Support for a peace agreement and two-state solution is much less now than before the intifada, and support for violence is of course much greater. When peace talks are resumed, and a basis for hope is restored, notes Major-General (res.) Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, Palestinian attitudes will moderate once again, as they have in the past. (Associated Press, 6/12/02) In his *Foreign Affairs* essay, Shikaki notes that "Between 1993 and 2001, with the sole exception of 1994, Palestinian support for the Oslo agreement never dropped below 60 percent. But Palestinian hopes began to fade away as a result of both Binyamin Netanyahu's election as Israel's prime minister in mid-1996 and the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian expectations that the peace process

would soon lead to statehood and a permanent settlement dropped from 44 percent during Shimon Peres' prime ministership in 1995-96 to 30 percent in the first year under Netanyahu. Four years later, with Ehud Barak having replaced Netanyahu and Jewish settlements continuing to expand, expectation of a permanent settlement sank to 24 percent. Once Ariel Sharon won election as Israel's head of government in early 2001, a mere 11 percent of Palestinians clung to that hope. The loss of confidence in the ability of the peace process to deliver a permanent agreement on acceptable terms had a dramatic impact on the level of Palestinian support for violence against Israelis, including suicide bombings against civilians. In July 2000, after U.S. President Bill Clinton's failed attempt to broker a final peace settlement at Camp David but before the eruption of the second intifada, already 52 percent of Palestinians approved of the use of violence; a year later, that figure reached the unprecedented level of 86 percent.”

³⁰Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), pp. 61-2.

³¹Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs at the End of the Century (New York: Farrar, 1999), pp. 189, 197.

³²Rabinovich, p. 197.

³³Peres, p. 81.

³⁴Peres, 173.