Hard Questions, Tough Answers:
A Weekly APN Q & A With Israeli Security Expert Yossi Alpher

June 28, 2002

Q. What are the highlights, expected and unexpected, in President Bush's June 24 speech at the White House on Israeli-Palestinian issues?

A. The overall music was expected; the specific notes Bush chose to play were not.

Based on all we have seen and heard of President Bush's attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it was to be expected that he would stick to generalities that would not commit him and the prestige of his presidency to any specific involvement in solving the conflict. His "vision" would, at best, be vague and noncommittal, except with regard to Israel's security. In anticipation of approaching mid-term elections in the US, Bush was certain to emphasize "motherhood and apple pie" values, such as democracy in the Palestinian Authority, that would find favor with the electorate, and avoid issues, such as immediate pressure on Israel to stop the spread of settlements, that might get him into trouble with important hard-line elements within the pro-Israel lobby.

It also seemed likely that President Bush would seek to integrate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into his overall world view on combating terrorism and the American role therein, which, after all, has become the dominant theme of his administration. His closing biblical quote, "I have set before you life and death, therefore choose life", was a particularly moving and timely response to Palestinian suicide bombers. In this regard, too, harsh criticism of Yasir Arafat was to be expected, given PM Sharon's broad success, with Bush and others, in discrediting the Palestinian leader as a terrorist and a pathological liar.

But when we look at the specifics, there are major items in the Bush presentation that were difficult to anticipate. In this sense the president maintained a measure of surprise, if not always of logic and consistency.

By focusing on the need to remove Arafat by democratic means and radically reform the Palestinian Authority, the president appeared to be taking on a mission impossible. His pointed demands upon the Palestinian public are likely to make it harder, not easier, to accomplish these tasks, because Palestinian reformers and opponents of Arafat are now more likely to be branded as collaborators. His call for "a new constitution which separates the powers of government" ignores the fact that such a constitution exists-it was drafted in the mid-90s with the advice of American NGOs-and was finally signed by Arafat, under pressure from liberal Palestinian activists, along with a host of additional reforms, including the naming of new and impressive ministers of finance, education and internal security, several weeks ago.

By the same token, Bush's determination that "Arab states will work with Palestinian leaders to create a new constitutional framework and a working democracy" is at best naïve: there are virtually no Arab states with genuine working democracies; they are hardly likely to advise Arafat on separation-of-powers issues; nor does Bush focus criticism upon the Arabs' own less-than-democratic state systems as long as they support his War on Terror, and in view of the likelihood that free elections in places like Egypt would almost certainly strengthen Islamist factions at the expense of pro-western liberals.

This is not to imply that the current efforts of Palestinian reformers that Bush ignores will necessarily have any lasting effect. Arafat remains in control, and in democratic elections, now scheduled for January, he will almost certainly be reelected, though his parliament, too, could be taken over by Islamists if they choose to run. Alternatively, if Arafat is removed from power, his successor is more than likely to be an extremist or to adopt extreme policies merely in order to hold onto power. Rather, Bush's demands upon the Palestinians, however noble, appear so unlikely to reach fruition that one must question his determination that "with intensive effort by all of us, [final status] agreement could be reached within three years from now". Nor are security for Israelis and an end to terrorism-major topics of emphasis in Bush's presentation-likely \to be achieved in this way.

This is particularly so in view of the president's reluctance to offer the Palestinians any immediate incentives to do his bidding. Palestinians must take as an article of faith that if they depose their legally-elected leader, Bush will compel Sharon to deliver on territories and East Jerusalem and to dismantle settlements-all concessions that Sharon has vowed never to make. True, Bush indicates that Israel will eventually have to withdraw from territories, cease settlement building, and roll back its forces. But none of this need commence until "we make progress toward security". Israel will also have to "work toward a final status agreement" and end the occupation (a term Bush uses specifically and pointedly), but only "as new Palestinian institutions and new leaders emerge".

Bush's speech contains no mention at all of the recent forward-looking ideas presented by the Saudis and Egyptians and endorsed by the Arab League. On the other hand, he expects these states "to build closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel. . . as we move toward a peaceful solution". Little wonder that the praise for Bush's speech from Palestinian and other Arab quarters sounds like it is dictated by considerations of expediency rather than sincerity.

Q. What, then, are the implications of Bush's speech, with its emphasis on a democratic Palestinian state and security for Israel, for the Israeli quest for relief from the campaign of suicide bombings and the Palestinian quest for an end to the occupation? What, in effect, is the relationship between Bush's political horizon and the quest for security and a diplomatic resolution?

A. The short answer is this: until now it was clear that neither of the two principals, Sharon and Arafat, had a coherent and realistic peace policy. Now it is clear that the only conceivable third party that might be able to intervene and compel Israelis and Palestinians to return to a peace process-President Bush-also has no coherent and realistic peace policy.

Suppose, against all odds, that Palestinians took Bush at his word, deposed Arafat, stopped the violence, and instituted an instant functioning democracy. What could they then expect from the US administration? Bush offers no clear vision of the end objective of the process except a democratic Palestine; no constructive guidelines other than a three year deadline seemingly divorced from reality; no demands upon Israel other than those of the Mitchell Report; no commitment to pressure Sharon to actually remove settlements and give up more territory; no international conference (an American-backed idea until recently); no real American role-in short, no road map for getting from here to there.

Of course, at an abstract level, Bush is justified in demanding the dismissal of Arafat and the cessation of the violence he has fostered, as ends in and of themselves, without "trade-offs" and "compensation". But Middle East politics does not work in the abstract. Indeed, if Bush's message is that a Palestinian state can only be reconciled with Israeli security by deposing Arafat, then it is more likely that it will be interpreted by PM Sharon as a green light for Israel to remove the Palestinian leader by force, with potentially violent and escalatory consequences.

Short of such a development, Israelis and Palestinians appear doomed to remain in the current downward spiral, until Israel semi-permanently reoccupies all of the Palestinian Authority. Yet this, too, will not stop the terrorism.

Only a number of far-reaching developments could conceivably alter this dead-end equation. First, if the Intifada overflows into Jordan due to rioting there or the mass flight of Palestinians from the West Bank, the international community may be forced to intervene. Conceivably, in certain disastrous circumstances that can no longer be ruled out, even Israel might invite an international force to replace it in the territories.

Secondly, Israelis are increasingly pressuring their government to build a separation fence and dismantle outlying settlements unilaterally. The lack of promise in Bush's approach can only further catalyze this process.

Third, the one obvious immediate operational conclusion that appears to emerge from Bush's speech is that the US may now spearhead a "search" for a suitable successor to Arafat, a Palestinian "Karzai". How this might happen, and how such a leader might credibly be installed in power (with Israeli armed protection? with Egyptian, Saudi and Jordanian blessings?) can only be matters for wild speculation.

Finally, the Bush speech is unlikely to constitute the final word from an administration which only recently affirmed Arafat's indispensability. Indeed, the very next day the speech was being "fine tuned" by administration spokespersons. The incessant jockeying for influence over Middle East policy between the Pentagon and the State Department is reflected in the rough mix of ideas that this speech did not succeed in integrating into a coherent policy. And since the approach outlined by Bush is, like its predecessors, almost certain to fail or even backfire badly, the administration's next policy pronouncement on the Middle East cannot be far away.